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ABSTRACT 
 
The unifying theme of this dissertation is spatial inequality, or regional disparities, driven by   
two primary motivations.  First, spatial inequality can contribute to the overall inequality across 
households or individuals.  Second, spatial inequality can jeopardize the fabric of society, 
upsetting social and political stability.  Regional disparities have increasingly become the focus 
of policy and academic interests, especially in a diverse society such as Indonesia, where 
geographic units often align with divisions in economic performance, political and cultural 
aspirations, language, and religion, among others.  This dissertation assesses the spatial 
inequality and convergence dynamics across districts in the province of East Java and studies the 
impact of Indonesia’s 2001 fiscal decentralization on regional income disparities across districts.   
East Java is chosen as a case study because of its economical and geopolitical importance 
to Indonesia.  In addition, East Java has been dubbed a case of “balanced development,” an 
assessment that this dissertation intends to reexamine.  By synthesizing the approaches of sigma 
and beta convergences and distribution dynamics, and by employing a variety of methods, this 
dissertation suggests the strong presence of clubs convergence with slow conditional catch-up 
process.  The clusters of poor, medium, and high income districts are expected to remain.   
The 2001 fiscal decentralization attempted to promote equalization by addressing vertical 
and horizontal imbalances and by providing district governments with incentives for 
development.  One important research question is whether the Indonesian decentralization 
delivered on its equity promise.  Using fixed-effects panel estimation, this paper addresses the 
following questions: 1) whether there has been a reduction in income disparities across districts; 
2) whether the decentralization was an inequality-reducing force; and 3) how the districts’ level 
of development may have influenced the effect of decentralization on inequality.  The striking 
findings reveal that a reduction in inequality is associated with greater decentralization.  
However, the decentralization impact on disparities is affected by the districts’ level of 
development.  Inequality may persist until Indonesian districts reach a certain level of 
development, which seems to be out of reach for most districts.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Spatial inequality and regional economic convergence/divergence are central issues in the 
literature on regional development theory and growth and planning.  For decades these issues 
have attracted the attention of a diverse group of scholars and researchers.  Economists, 
geographers, regional scientists, planning scholars, and other social scientists have attempted to 
address the central questions of whether the gap in wealth between rich and poor regions has 
narrowed or widened and why disparities in various social-economic indicators across regions 
persist.  
The conceptual foundations for spatial inequality research can be traced back to 
neoclassical trade theory and growth theory, location theory, external scale economies, and 
central place theory which were already around as early as the 1920s (Dawkins 2003).  
Following the resurgence of interest in the 1990s regarding the relation between geography and 
economic activities, the following decade saw an emerging interest in spatial imbalance and its 
convergence process (Clark et al. 2000; Islam 2003; Neary 2001).  Indeed, the main focus of the 
World Development Report 2009 (World Bank 2009) surrounds the spatial dimensions of a 
development process where geographic realities of development are characterized by division 
(i.e., territorial variations), density (core-periphery contrasts), and distance (proximity and 
separation).   
This growing interest in spatial disparities and the convergence process was triggered by 
concern over the impacts of globalization and liberalization and the emergence of regions, 
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facilitated by scholarly advances in theory (e.g., endogenous growth theory and new economic 
geography) and in analytical tools (e.g., spatial data analysis and GIS).  Indeed, scholars and 
policy makers have tried to understand these two contrasting forces.  International boundaries are 
becoming more and more blurred and the world economy is increasingly integrated, yet regional 
identities and aspirations remain strongly articulated and some non-tariff barriers prevail.  In 
addition, there is a growing recognition that innovation processes and national economic growth 
dynamics are essentially spatial in nature (Cheshire and Malecki 2004).  As Krugman (1991: 3) 
asserts: “One of the best ways to understand how the international economy works is to start by 
looking at what happens inside nations.  If we want to understand differences in national growth 
rates, a good place to start is by examining differences in regional growth.”   
In addition to this analytical reason, interest on the topic is also motivated by policy or 
equity issues.  Knaap and Kim (1992) argue that research on disparities in regional development 
provides useful bases for comparison and helps to prescribe policies promoting the spatial 
distribution of economic activity in an economy.  Further, they argue that even if such attempts 
fail to foster economic development or growth, a more even distribution of economic activity 
across regions is desirable for equity concerns alone; this is very relevant to large and spatially 
diverse countries like Indonesia.  Therefore, research investigating regional development patterns 
and how they are related to decentralization are of great analytical and policy interest.  Of 
particular concern are the issues of spatial inequality and the convergence process. 
 
1.2 Background of the study areas 
Kim (1992) provides several reasons for why spatial inequality and regional development are 
particularly interesting issues in Indonesia.  First, from a high growth period in the 1980s and 
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1990s, insights can be obtained on the regional distribution of growth in a rapidly developing 
country.  Second, Indonesia offers policy lessons on urban problems associated with the high 
concentration of population and economic development in the island of Java.  Third, since the 
adoption of Repelita II (the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan) in 1974, the 
government of Indonesia has pursued a policy that favors the dispersion of growth throughout 
the country.  Thus, the Indonesian case is fertile ground for studying the effectiveness of 
government efforts in promoting the spatial dispersion of economic well-being.  In Kim et al. 
(1992), Azis (1992) finds that government transfers do affect the development of regional 
economies, though the effects are small.  Knaap and Kim (1992) observe the coincidence 
between the concentration of government development grants and the acceleration of the 
regional concentration of economic growth in Indonesia.  Being particularly driven by Kim’s 
(1992) first and third rationales, this dissertation assesses the convergence dynamics across 
districts in the province of East Java, one of the most dynamic provinces in Indonesia, and 
examines the impact of the Indonesia’ 2001 fiscal decentralization (one of the major reforms at 
the dusk of the New Order regime in 1998) on regional income disparities across Indonesian 
districts.  
 With respect to East Java as a case for studying spatial inequality, a compilation of fairly 
positive assessments on the East Java’s economic development in the New Order (Dick et al. 
1993) is worth re-examining.  Dick (1993: 21) states that “East Java seems to have combined 
impressive rates of growth with fairly balanced development in terms of sectoral composition, 
income distribution, and regional equity.”  In comparison with other Indonesian provinces, Dick 
(1993) suggests that the benefits of development appear to be more evenly distributed in East 
Java.  However, as a caveat, this does not mean that there are no remarkable inequalities between 
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income groups or persistent imbalances between the most developed and most remote parts of 
the province.  This dissertation is particularly interested in investigating the East Java spatial 
inequality using the most recent available data.  
 A more recent study on Indonesia’s economic geography by Hill et al. (2009) concludes 
that Indonesia continues to exhibit a great diversity in economic and social indicators and the 
concentration of economic activity, particularly in Java (especially for non-mining activities) and 
Sumatra.  Hill et al. (2009) suggest that a future research in the subject is an examination of the 
decentralization impact on regional dynamics.  This dissertation can be considered as a response 
to this call by first looking at the impact of decentralization on regional disparities.  It can be 
seen as an initial step of future research agenda, because the decentralization-regional dynamics 
research project, as added by Hill et al. (2009), should be a long-term project to discern various 
impacts.  
Other studies (e.g., Alm et al. 2004; Lewis 2005) have pointed out that Indonesia has 
undergone a significant transformation in many ways since 2001.  It is not surprising since 
decentralization itself is possibly the most profound transformation of government structure, 
especially for a country like Indonesia which, under the New Order regime, had been highly 
centralized.  As such profound transformation, its impact on a spatial dimension of economic 
development, i.e., regional income disparities, is worth studying.  
 
1.3 Convergence, growth, and inequality  
This sub-section briefly presents a theoretical and empirical overview on convergence and its 
connection to growth and spatial inequality.  In economics, the term “convergence” commonly 
refers to the hypothesis of a catching-up process, suggesting that poor economies should grow 
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faster than rich economies such that disparities in income should narrow over time.  This popular 
view follows the dominant approach, built upon the neoclassical growth model, widely seen in 
the convergence literature (Sala-i-Martin 1996).  This “classical approach” categorizes 
convergence into three primary concepts: unconditional/absolute β-convergence, conditional β-
convergence, and σ-convergence.  Unconditional/absolute β-convergence occurs if economies 
converge toward the same steady state, while the conditional β-convergence describes economies 
that grow toward different steady states.  The β-convergence is thought to be a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition for the narrowing σ-convergence or the dispersion of per capita income 
at a given point in time (Petrakos and Artelaris 2009).  
As part of the resurgence of interests in the spatial pattern and dynamics of inequality or 
income differentials, the issue of convergence has continued to attract attention and to generate 
enormous empirical studies at various geographical scales (e.g., Pritchett 1997 for international 
scale; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 for national scale using the US state-level data; and Higgins 
et al. 2006 for national scale using the US county-level data).  Following a series of seminal 
cross-country studies (Abramovitz 1986; Baumol 1986; Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
1992), scholars turned their attention toward regional convergence; i.e., convergence analysis on 
a set of regions within a country, where it can be reasonably assumed that there will be similar 
technology, institutions, and tastes.  Because regions within a country are much more likely to 
exhibit similar structural characteristics and to allow for a higher level of factors mobility than 
seen in different countries, evidence of absolute convergence might be more apparent at the 
regional system (Martin and Sunley 1998).   
Many studies favoring absolute convergence across US states, Japanese prefectures, 
European NUTS1 regions, Australian states, and Canadian provinces present similar speeds of 
6 
 
convergence, amounting to about two percent per year (see Martin and Sunley 1998 for the list 
of studies).  However, numerous other studies do not support the absolute convergence 
hypothesis (e.g., Mauro and Podrecca 1994 for Italian regions; Siriopoulos and Asteriou 1998 for 
Greek regions; and Tsionas 2001 for US states).  The contrasting results are due in part to the 
different empirical strategies employed.  From a policy perspective, convergence analysis can 
provide a basis for evaluating regional policy.  Meanwhile, from a theoretical point of view, the 
convergence study can be considered to be an empirical test for the different growth theories that 
offer different predictions and, therefore, would have different policy implications (Petrakos and 
Artelaris 2009).  
Eckey and Türck (2007) list the underlying growth theories of convergence analysis and 
their convergence/divergence predictions.  Neoclassical theory (Solow 1956; Swan 1956) 
predicts convergence because of diminishing capital productivity due to constant returns to scale 
and exogenously determined technology progress.  However, the critical theories—post 
Keynesianism (Schmidt 1966) and polarization theory (Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1965)— 
hypothesize divergence due to a spatially mobile demand, external shocks, and the domination of 
centripetal forces (i.e., the forces that pull population and economic activities into 
agglomeration).  In other words, the critical theories predict that disparities in economic well-
being will persist or even widen in the long run.  According to the endogenous growth theory 
(Romer 1986; Lucas 1988) and the new economic geography (NEG) pioneered by Krugman 
(1991), multiple equilibria are possible, subject to some specific economic conditions, such as 
the presence or lack of diminishing returns to scale, positive externalities, and transport costs.   
 Convergence research has used different methodologies which can be broadly 
categorized into the following approaches: the cross-section approach, the panel approach, the 
7 
 
time-series approach, and the distribution approach (Islam 2003; Magrini 2004).  The first three 
of these approaches have in part studied the β-convergence.  The cross-section approach has also 
been generally used to study the σ-convergence.  In addition to examining the σ-convergence, the 
distribution approach also investigates the entire shape of distribution and how it evolves over 
time.   
 
1.4 Regional economic development, decentralization, regional disparities 
In outlining a typology of new (endogenous) growth theories, Martin and Sunley (1998) 
acknowledge the role of government spending and taxation (fiscal arrangement) and public 
policy as the growth engine that may promote convergence.  Such convergence could be 
indicated by, among other factors, a decline in regional disparities.  Martin and Sunley (1998) 
also discuss the connection between institutions, indigenous (locally-based) development, and 
endogenous growth, while highlighting the role of institutions in shaping regional development.  
Ascani et al. (2012) argue that the localized nature of economic development and the importance 
of institutions would become more crucial as far as developing countries are concerned, because 
they are often characterized by strong patterns of spatial inequalities.   
Furthermore, a growing awareness that local processes generate economic development 
has motivated countries to embark on bottom-up approach, of which decentralization is a part.  
Prud’homme (1994) defines decentralization as the transfer of power or resources from central to 
subnational governments.  He outlines three types of administrative decentralization: a) 
deconcentration, or the redistribution of decision making to local governments; b) delegation, by 
which a semi-autonomous organization will have a closer involvement in policy making; and c) 
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devolution, through which a lower autonomous government tier has some degree of power or 
even enjoys full power in some policy areas. 
 Suggesting a global trend toward decentralization,  Davoodi and Zou (1998) note that 63 
out of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 million claim to 
have undergone some forms of power transfer to local governments or lower government tiers. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003) observe the different implementations of decentralization across 
countries.  Some countries, such as Italy and Spain, applied federalist state structures according 
to different degrees of decentralization.  Others, such as France, the UK, and some developing 
countries (including Indonesia), have finally embarked on a path toward decentralization after 
long-standing practices of centralized governance.  Federalist countries like the US, Australia, 
and India, have continuously refined their decentralization practices, while countries like Mexico 
and Brazil have been more seriously practicing their decentralization mandates than before.  
The transfer of authority and resources from the central to local governments is expected 
to positively affect economic development.  Policy formulation at a local level allows for a 
greater recognition of local needs and is more likely to win greater support and ensure smooth 
implementation, making the execution of a development plan and strategy more effective and 
sustainable.  Amin (1999) argues that decentralization improves local governments’ capacity to 
formulate and implement development strategies that incorporate the socio-institutional 
underpinnings of local economic interactions.  Therefore, decentralization creates sustainable 
and locally-oriented policy actions, as they rely on a bottom-up approach and enjoy the support 
of local multi-stakeholders.  
Studies that link decentralization to economic development are generally based on the 
efficiency or equity argument.  As this dissertation’s unifying theme is spatial inequality, and 
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other chapters address the inequality-decentralization relationship, the remaining discussion in 
this section will focus on the relationship between decentralization and equity.  
Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that it contributes to the reduction of income 
disparities between regions by encouraging territorial competition. Thus, poorer regions offer 
favorable conditions and incentives to attract populations and production.  Because 
decentralization allows local governments to play an active role in managing local economic 
development, territorial competition presents an opportunity for poorer regions (Ezcurra and 
Pascual 2008).  According to Canaleta et al. (2004), decentralization can be a means of 
diversifying development strategies that would benefit local economies.  The central 
government’s pursuit of traditional industrial policies is often biased in favor of the most high-
performing industries; industries that are more likely to be located in rich areas.  Thus, in the 
absence of decentralization, such strategies may exclude poor regions.  Another benefit of 
decentralization is that the downsizing of central government may reduce the concentration of 
economic activity in capital or core regions, thus promoting the dispersion of such activity 
throughout the country and eventually narrowing spatial inequalities.  
On the other hand, decentralization may also widen spatial inequalities.  Rodríguez-Pose 
and Gill (2005) identify two mechanisms by which decentralization may have detrimental effects 
on equity.  First, rich regions naturally exercise stronger bargaining power than poor regions 
when influencing the central government’s decision making.  This is often because the economic 
interests of rich regions may be better aligned with those of the central government, including 
having a larger electorate.  Second, rich regions are considerably more competitive than poor 
regions.  As rich regions are better endowed with physical and human capital, among other 
advantages, it may simply be too difficult for poor regions to pursue territorial competition.  Poor 
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regions may also experience difficulties in implementing developmental policies because their 
small tax base limits their spending capacity.  
 
1.5 Overview of the essays 
This dissertation explores the geographic realities of economic development, as stated above.  
The essays deal with the measurement issues on spatial inequality and convergence processes 
and how such observed regional disparities relate to governance (in this case, decentralization).  
The following sub-sections present essential findings of the essays.  
 
1.5.1 Assessing Indonesia’s East Java spatial inequality and convergence process:  
a holistic approach 
During the study period (1980-2005), disparities had widened irrespective of the inequality 
measures.  A significantly higher level of inequality was observed in the 1990s, a period of high 
growth accompanied by major policy and economic events, such as deeper liberalization and 
economic crises.  Some mobility of the middle cities to the richer group occurred in the mid-
1990s, but bimodality again became sharper in the early 2000s.  The distribution dynamics 
analysis indicates the strong presence of clubs.  All else equal, such polarization will likely 
persist due to the high stability of the transition process.  A scenario of upward mobility could 
take up to three decades.    
The study detects a slow catching-up process that would only occur when a city’s 
characteristics, thought to be determinants of growth, are taken into account.  This research 
reveals mixed evidence in support of the absolute β-convergence hypothesis, which is often said 
to be more likely to occur across regions within a country.  For the whole period (1983-2005), 
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the estimates fail to provide significant evidence for the absolute β-convergence hypothesis; 
nonetheless, the significant absolute β-convergence appeared in the shorter period (1983-1992).  
In the subsequent period (1993-2005), there was a tendency of divergence, by which the already 
richer cities consistently outgrew the poorer ones.  If some cities’ characteristics are controlled 
for, such catching-up processes appeared, lending support to the conditional β-convergence 
hypothesis.  The widening disparities and the sustained gap between the rich and the poor cities 
could be attributed to the presence of divergence force in the absolute β-convergence hypothesis, 
the slow convergence process in the conditional β-convergence hypothesis, and the absence of 
spatial spillovers.  
From the perspective of spatial inequality, the findings do not support the old view that 
suggests East Java is a case of “balanced development.”  This essay does not offer a specific 
policy recommendation, because it focuses on the inequality measurements and convergence 
characteristics, rather than performing a welfare analysis.  However, it very briefly mentions the 
importance of a two-pronged approach that combines the virtue of place-based prosperity and 
people-centered prosperity.  
 
1.5.2 Regional income disparities in decentralizing Indonesia, 2001-2007 
Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia over the period 2001-2007 was associated with a decrease in 
inequality across Indonesian districts, measured by district-level per capita GDP with and 
without oil and gas.  The observed reduction in inequality was attributable to the reduction in 
within-province inequality and the reduction in relative provincial means.  
Estimating the fixed-effects model on a district-level panel dataset, this paper studies how 
the current fiscal decentralization arrangement affects the between-districts inequality.  It 
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examines the impact of the different components of the equalization fund on the inequality.  In 
addition, it analyzes the influence of the district’s level of development on the inequality-
decentralization relationship.  It also studies how other factors might have affected the observed 
inequality. 
Through various estimation strategies, this study reveals consistent results, suggesting 
that greater fiscal decentralization in general significantly reduces the inequality between 
districts.  Of the fiscal decentralization measures, there is limited significant evidence of an 
inequality-widening effect of tax-based revenue sharing, even though the inequality-widening 
effect decreases as the level of development rises.  On the other hand, the level of development 
also moderates the inequality-reducing effects of other fiscal decentralization instruments.  The 
level of development alone plays a critical role as a determinant of observed inequality and as a 
modifying factor that affects the effect of a fiscal decentralization indicator on the observed 
inequality.  
Development spending, the manufacturing sector, infrastructure, urban concentration, and 
public sector size are found to be the significant equalizing forces.  Aside from its extensiveness 
and novelty, this thesis offers important policy implications.  The findings can potentially help to 
guide efforts to address Indonesia’s interregional inequality, either through improving the 
decentralization framework or by addressing complementary public policy options related to 
spending, the role and size of the public sector, infrastructure, economic structure, and urban 
population at the district level.  
This paper demonstrates that decentralization is a welfare-enhancing and necessary 
policy to address regional disparities.  However, this essay also shows that development level 
and other factors also play a role in the observed inequality dynamics.  Therefore, the continuing 
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implementation of decentralization is justified and necessary, yet it should be integrated with a 
broader development strategy aimed at a higher level of development as a primary and ultimate 
goal.  A district government, especially of poorer districts, needs to formulate and implement 
strategies of gain that include preserving and attracting economic activities in a sector deemed to 
be an engine for the economy, such as the manufacturing sector.  Inward investment can be 
attracted by adding to or improving the quality of infrastructure.  To generate and to exploit 
economies of scale, or because a certain kind of infrastructure is simply too expensive for a 
district, it is sometimes better for a district to cooperate with other districts.  In this regard and in 
coping with inter-district issues (such as performance standard or pollution), the role of 
provincial government can be called for and reinforced.  Cooperation between districts can take 
various forms; the simplest one being a forum in which to share best practices in public service 
deliveries.           
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Chapter 2 
Assessing Indonesia’s East Java Spatial Inequality and Convergence Process: 
A Holistic Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The recognition of spatial inequality and regional convergence in Indonesia has prompted 
considerable scholarly attention (Akita 1988; Akita and Lukman 1999; Booth 2000; Garcia and 
Soelistianingsih 1998; Islam and Khan 1986).  Nonetheless, three motivations drive this paper to 
revisit the issue and to consider East Java as a case study.  First, while the literature typically 
emphasizes beta (β)-convergence, this paper adds to this important measure an attention to sigma 
(σ)-convergence: i.e., whether real per capita income disparities across regions narrow over time.  
Thus, σ-convergence offers more direct policy implications, including questions like whether the 
geographic distribution of income is becoming more equitable (Quah 1993; Friedman 1992).  At 
the same time, this paper does not ignore the role of β-convergence as a necessary condition for 
σ-convergence.  For a better analysis on spatial inequality, this paper employs a distribution 
analysis using kernel density estimation and Markov chain analysis in addition to a variety of 
inequality measures designed to avoid relying on one or two inequality indices, such as Gini or 
the coefficient of variation (CV), both heavily used in inequality studies.  Aware of the 
possibility of the autocorrelation typically found in cross-sectional data, this paper also employs 
exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) to determine whether a spatial model is necessary to 
deal with spatial dependence, an aspect overlooked by previous work.  
Second, unlike previous studies using cross-sectional data at the provincial level, this 
paper employs cross-sectional data at the city/municipal level in the East Java province.  Such 
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finer geographic scales better capture spatial effects which might otherwise be unobservable or 
negligible if examined at broader aggregations of geographical units (Le Gallo and Ertur 2003).  
Some scholars also argue that spatial inequality and convergence studies are best carried out at 
the city/county level (Higgins et al. 2006).  With an extended 25-year research frame (1980-
2005) that encompasses a period of earlier and deeper liberalization, the Asian financial crisis, 
and the early decentralization era, this paper is well-positioned to analyze the development 
dynamics over a wider range.  
Third, this paper solely focuses on East Java province.  As such, estimations will have 
less nuisance given the fact that cities within a province reasonably exhibit less difference in 
endowments and locations than do provinces across the country (e.g., natural 
resources/mining/oil-rich provinces vs. others, eastern provinces vs. western provinces).  Indeed, 
East Java represents a particularly interesting case study.  It is one of two major industrial 
provinces to consistently thrive without mining; it maintains a regional per capita GDP never 
below 85 percent of the national average; and it represented one of the fastest growing provinces 
in the period from 1984-2004 (Hill et al. 2009).  Thus, whether there is a variation in the 
distribution of per capita GDP across East Java cities and how it evolved over time are worthy of 
further study.  Furthermore, once dubbed a “balanced development,” East Java has sustained 
high growth rates while maintaining a fairly equal distribution of benefits across sectors, income 
groups, and cities (Mackie 1993).  Therefore, this research presents an opportunity to examine 
whether this long conventional wisdom still holds, at least from the spatial perspective.  
Although development during the high growth period has dramatically decreased absolute 
poverty, relative poverty, and hence income disparities, is by no means less important, as it 
might represent a source of social and political instability.  
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With these motivations in mind, this paper’s primary objective is to research the pattern 
of spatial disparities and its convergence process in East Java.  As such, it aims to answer a set of 
interrelated questions:  
1) Do disparities across regions in East Java fall or increase over time?  
2) Can possible “catching-up” processes be detected? 
3) If yes, how fast are the transition processes and how far do they extend? 
4) Is there an underlying spatial dependence responsible for the observed pattern of 
inequality? 
5) What are other determinants of the observed regional development pattern?  
 
Section 2.2 provides background for the case study, while section 2.3 outlines the overall 
conceptual framework.  The remaining sections address the research questions above, with a 
question or a combination of closely related questions constituting individual section.  
Methodological discussions are carried out in these question-driven sections.  The final section 
summarizes the findings and presents conclusions.  
 
2.2 Background 
Among Indonesia’s thirty-three provinces, East Java represents the country’s second most 
populous region and the second largest regional economy.  Together with Jakarta and West Java, 
the three provinces account for half of Indonesia’s GDP, and have for years.  Since the 1960s, 
the manufacturing industry has played a key role in East Java’s economy, and the sharp growth 
of the industry (especially in the late 1980s) has been a driving force in East Java’s economic 
development (Mackie 1993).  Between 1998 and 2008, approximately one third of East Java’s 
20 
 
economy was attributable to the manufacturing sector, even while the manufacturing 
employment’s share of East Java’s employment was lower in the same period: between 14% to 
19% (BPS 2009; Pemprov Jatim 2002a).  Furthermore, manufacturing employment in East Java 
is spatially concentrated.  Irawan (2011) finds disparities in the employment share of large and 
medium scale manufacturing across East Java’s cities.  Some industries are more localized than 
others and such observed concentration patterns are higher than would be expected if the firms 
had chosen locations in a random manner, implying that some cities have a different industrial 
structure than others.  Figure 2.1 depicts the location of East Java and maps the distribution of 
the 2002 manufacturing employment in the province.   
Inequality across East Java’s cities is generally observed and acknowledged in the 
scholarship.  Indeed, many official documents
1
 state that East Java exhibits some measure of 
inequality among its cities.  During the period between 1998 and 2002, agricultural cities (e.g., 
Pacitan, Ponorogo, Trenggalek, Tulungagung, Blitar, Kediri, and Malang) had lower per capita 
GDPs, yet higher growth, than the provincial average.  Meanwhile, industrial cities like 
Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, Gresik and other urban areas experienced relatively stable high per capita 
GDP with fluctuating growth rates.  In some years, the per capita GDP of these industrial cities 
grew higher than the regional average, but in others their growth rates were lower.   
There have been many policy discussions concerning the issue of regional inequality, and 
several regional development policies have been enacted to deal with such inequality.  In fact, 
regional inequality has become a popular catchphrase of political jargon, especially during local 
and regional elections.  However, scholarly work has neglected to thoroughly examine these 
                                               
1
 For example: Perda No. 8/2005, the East Java mid-term development plan (RPJMD) 2006-2008 and 
Perda No. 1/2009, the East Java long-term development plan (RPJPD) 2005-2025, both legally defined as 
a regional act, as well as the province’s official assessment on the regional economy (Pemprov Jatim 
2002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2005b, 2009).  
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policy or political exercises.  Such an examination should assess the particular dimensions of 
inequality in order to provide a more complete picture of its evolution and its underlying 
dynamics and to produce a set of measures.  This paper intends to fill this gap, to better inform 
East Java’s regional development planning, and to promote research-guided policies.   
This paper is concerned with why some regions persistently outperform others and 
examines the possibility that the government can affect the patterns of spatial inequality.  In this 
regard, this paper has a particular interest in the process of regional economic convergence that 
links regional output to government spending/fiscal characteristics and human capital.  Key 
economic and policy issues to be investigated include whether there are forces that lead to 
convergence over time in the levels of per capita product, and how public policies affect such a 
convergence process.  
 
 Figure 2.1 Distribution of manufacturing employment in East Java.  
 Source: Author’s creation based on the data of BPS (2002).  
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2.3 Conceptual framework 
2.3.1 Spatial inequality 
From a theoretical perspective, spatial inequality is essentially determined by the location 
decisions that lead to maximizing profits for firms and in maximizing job market opportunities 
and utilities for households.  At a regional level, observed spatial inequality is the result of the 
two opposing forces of concentration and dispersion, simultaneously affecting and being affected 
by the location decisions of both firms and households.  The centripetal forces of concentration 
include natural advantages, Marshallian externalities (e.g., labor market pooling, non-traded 
intermediate services, and knowledge spillovers), and non-pecuniary externalities (e.g., market 
size and forward and backward linkages).  The centrifugal forces of dispersion include less 
mobile/immobile factors and high transportation/communication costs (Kim 2008).   
According to neoclassical explanations of regional inequality, the spread (or 
concentration) of economic activity over space will follow the spread (or concentration) of the 
underlying differences, which might be differences in factor intensities (the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model) or in technology (the Ricardian model).  As Kim (2008) notes, though the models differ 
in defining the underlying differences, both models predict a widening regional spatial inequality 
if goods are mobile, but factors are immobile.  This theoretical strand is also known as 
comparative advantage theory, which assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale.   
While still relevant, comparative advantage theory has its drawbacks, as it does not 
satisfactorily explain why, quite often, very similar regions end up with very different production 
structures (Ottaviano and Puga 1997).  Two other theoretical strands are new trade theory (NTT) 
and new economic geography (NEG) that bring in an additional set of assumptions, such as 
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increasing returns to scale (either internal or external to firms), imperfect competition, and trade 
costs.   
 
2.3.2 Convergence concepts 
Studies examining convergence across economic units are partly driven by an interest in 
examining the pattern and determinants of long-term growth.  There appear to be three main 
measures of economic convergence: σ-convergence, unconditional β-convergence, and 
conditional β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  There is said to be σ- convergence 
when dispersion (typically measured in standard deviations or the coefficient of variation, CV) of 
output or income per capita decreases over time.  The latter two measures indicate that poorer 
economies tend to grow faster than richer ones; i.e., when there is a negative partial correlation 
between growth in output or income per capita over a period of time and its initial level.  
One can distinguish between two types of β-convergence because they have different 
underlying theoretical frameworks and implications (de la Fuente 2000).  Consistent with a 
neoclassical framework, unconditional or absolute β-convergence denotes the condition whereby 
each economy converges to the same output or income per capita, regardless of its initial 
condition.  Absolute β-convergence implies an equalization of output or income per capita.  
Initially, poorer economies tend to grow faster until they catch up with richer ones.  In the long 
run, the welfare indicator will be the same for all economies.
2
  Conditional β-convergence thus 
describes the condition whereby economies are structurally different and the welfare indicator 
does not necessarily converge to the same level, but where in the long run, the differences across 
                                               
2 Yet, inequality may still appear, for there will be random shocks with uneven impacts on the different 
economies. However, the shocks may only have only transitory effects, implying that, in the long run, we 
should observe a fluid distribution in which the relative positions of the different economies change 
rapidly.  
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economic units become stationary and the growth rates are the same.  Conditional β-convergence 
predicts that each economy converges to its own steady state, but these can be very different.  
Therefore, a high degree of inequality can persist, even in the long run.  As a consequence, high 
persistence in the relative positions of the different economies will be observed.   
Convergence literature has acknowledged the relationship between σ-convergence and β-
convergence.  Young et al. (2008) provides mathematical proof and empirical evidence, using 
US data at county level between 1970-1998, that β-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for σ-convergence.  In their study, σ-convergence is not detected in the presence of β-
convergence; instead, they observe σ-divergence in many cases.   
 
2.4 σ-Convergence 
A popular methodology for investigating convergence is by running growth-initial level 
regressions, widely known as “Barro regressions.”3  A convergence hypothesis expects to see a 
negative correlation in the coefficient of the initial income level in the Barro regressions (i.e., β).  
However, some scholars (e.g., Friedman 1992; Quah 1993) have argued that convergence 
regarding dispersion of the cross-sectional distribution of income and a negative β from the 
growth-initial level regression does not necessarily imply a reduction in the dispersion.  
According to this view, convergence should be judged directly by looking at the dynamics of 
dispersion of income or output level across places, rather than judged indirectly through the sign 
                                               
3 The growth-initial income equation is typically expressed as follows:  
  (
   
      
)        (      )     , where   is the parameter representing the economies’ economic and 
social characteristics.   
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of β.  This notion emphasizes the concept of σ-convergence, where σ represents dispersion of the 
cross-sectional distribution of income or output level.    
Young et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that σ-convergence need not accompany 
β-convergence.  Following Sala-i-Martin’s (1996) exposition assuming that β-convergence holds 
for each economy within the sample, Young et al. (2008) derive the equation of the evolution of 
the sample variance of log income,   
 , and the equation of the steady-state variance, (  ) .    
Given 0 < β < 1, the steady-state variance is  
(  )  
  
 
[  (   ) ]
    (1) 
Therefore, cross-sectional dispersion decreases with β, but increases with   
 .  In other words, β-
convergence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for σ-convergence.  Intuitively, this is 
because economies can converge towards one another, even while random shocks can push them 
apart.  In the case of conditional β-convergence, where the parameter   representing various 
economic and/or socio-demographic variables in the Barro regression differs across economies, 
economies can converge towards different steady-states.  Further, Young et al. (2008) find that 
σ-convergence did not occur across the US or within a majority of the individual US states 
between 1970 to 1998, even though there was evidence of β-convergence in the same period.   
In sum, the concept of σ-convergence has two advantages: 1) it is a direct description of 
income or output across economies and 2) it does not rely on the estimation of a particular 
model.  As a result, σ-convergence is considered to be a more reality-revealing concept and of 
greater policy interest with regard to equity issues (Friedman 1992; Quah 1993).  This section is 
devoted to examining whether the disparities across regions in East Java fall or increase over 
time using σ-convergence approach.  To do so, it computes various inequality indices and 
analyzes their trends and patterns.   
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2.4.1 Inequality indices 
The most frequently used dispersion measures for the analysis of σ-convergence are the standard 
deviation or the coefficient of variation, CV.  However, other summary measures of inequality 
have been developed.  This sub-section draws on Haughton and Khandker (2009) to present the 
most important of these inequality measures.  This paper employs CV, decile dispersion ratio, 
Gini coefficient, generalized entropy measures, and Atkinson’s inequality measures to evaluate 
the distribution of per capita GDP across East Java cities.  To evaluate σ-convergence, this paper 
uses data series on per capita output measured as the natural log of real regional per capita GDP 
(1993 prices) from 1980 to 2005 rather than per capita income, as the former is more readily 
available.  The data is compiled from the BPS series on regional GDP across East Java cities 
(various years) and Pemprov Jatim (2002b, 2005b).  
 
Coefficient of variation 
The coefficient of variation, CV, is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability 
distribution.  It is simply formulated to be the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean and is 
often reported as the given ratio multiplied by 100.  This ratio suggests that for a given standard 
deviation value, the CV indicates a high or low degree of variability only in relation to the mean 
value.   
Both the CV and the standard deviation measure dispersion.  However, because the CV is 
independent of measurement units, it is more desirable than the standard deviation.  The standard 
deviation and the mean of a variable are expressed in the same units, so taking the ratio of these 
two values cancels the units.  Therefore, it allows for a meaningful comparison of the 
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distribution of two different variables; i.e., the higher the CV, the greater the dispersion in the 
variable.  
 
Decile dispersion ratio 
The decile dispersion ratio is a simple and popular measure of inequality.  It takes the ratio of the 
average output (or income, expenditure, or any other welfare indicators) of the richest 10% of the 
population to the average output (or other indicators of interest) of the poorest 10%.  The 
dispersion ratio is flexible because it can take other percentiles, such as taking the ratio of the 
average of a given variable of the richest 5% (i.e., the 95
th
 percentile) to the one of the poorest 
5% (i.e., the 5
th
 percentile).  
By expressing the income of the “richest” (the top 10% earners) as a multiple of that of 
the “poorest” (the bottom 10% earners), the planning stakeholders can easily interpret the ratio 
and comprehend the state of inequality.  Nonetheless, its disadvantage is that it ignores 
information in the middle of the distribution and even overlooks the distribution within the top 
and bottom deciles or any defined percentiles.   
 
Gini coefficient of inequality 
The Gini coefficient is probably the most widely used inequality index.  It is derived from the 
Lorenz curve, a cumulative frequency curve that compares the distribution of a given variable 
(e.g., output or income) with the uniform distribution representing equality.  The Gini coefficient 
takes a value between 0 and 1, where a Gini = 0 represents perfect equality, while a Gini = 1 
indicates complete inequality.   
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Formally, let xi be a point on the horizontal axis (that depicts the cumulative percentage 
of cross-sectional units, e.g., poorest to richest cities or households) and yi represent a point on 
the vertical axis (that represents cumulative percentage of a given variable, e.g., output, income, 
or expenditure).  Then, 
        ∑ (       )(       )
 
    (2) 
Of six criteria for a good inequality measure, the Gini coefficient satisfies the criteria of mean 
independence, population size independence, symmetry, Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity, and 
statistical testability, ignoring the criterion of decomposability (Haughton and Khandker 2009).   
Despite a nearly satisfactory measure, the Gini index is not decomposable or additive across 
groups.  The total Gini index of the population is not equal to the sum of the Gini index of its 
sub-populations.   
 
Generalized entropy measures 
The general formula of the generalized entropy (GE) inequality measures is  
  ( )  
 
 (   )
[
 
 
 ∑ (
  
 ̅
)
 
      ]    (3)  
where  ̅ is the mean of a given variable per capita (e.g., regional per capita GDP).  The value of 
GE measures takes between 0 and infinity, with 0 representing an equal distribution and higher 
values representing higher levels of inequality.  The parameter α can take any real value and 
defines the weight given to distances between values of the variable at different parts of the 
distribution.  For lower values of α, GE is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the 
distribution, and for higher values of α, GE is more sensitive to changes in the upper tail.   
The commonly used values of α are 0, 1, and 2.  The GE(0) is also known as the mean 
log deviation, or Theil’s L, and the GE(1) is Theil’s T; each is expressed as follows:  
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The   ( ) is equal to half the square of the coefficient of variation.  The   ( ) can be 
additively decomposed as the sum of within-group inequality,     ( )  and between-group 
inequality,     ( ).  Thus, the   ( ) measures satisfy all six criteria.   
 
Atkinson’s inequality measures 
As in the generalized entropy measures, the Atkinson’s inequality measures also differ in their 
sensitivities in different parts of the distribution.  In the Atkinson class, the degree of sensitivity 
is defined by the inequality aversion parameter ε, which measures aversion to inequality.   
The common values of ε are 0.5, 1, and 2.  The more positive ε > 0 is, the more sensitive 
   is to income differences at the bottom of the distribution.  The Atkinson class is formulated as 
follows:  
     ⌊
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              (7) 
The Atkinson class is also decomposable, even though it is not additively decomposable:  
                          (8) 
 
2.4.2 Observed trend of increasing disparities 
The early 1990s onward witnessed CV levels higher than the median; such a time span was more 
than half of the whole research period.  Even within the below-median period, there was an 
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increasing trend of disparities indicated by higher CV levels, especially in the second half of the 
1980s to the early 1990s (see figure 2.2).  Overall, it is reasonable to say that disparities rose 
within the study period.   
 However, if the study period is divided into sub-periods, a sequential pattern of 
convergence (i.e., a trend of decreasing CV levels, hence decreasing disparities) and divergence 
(i.e., a trend of increasing CV levels, hence increasing disparities) emerges.  Let us divide the full 
period into four sub-periods as follows: Convergence 1(C1), 1980-1985; Divergence 1 (D1), 
1986-1997; Convergence 2 (C2), 1998-2000; and Divergence 2 (D2), 2001-2005.  Alternatively, 
because the D1 period consists of two different steepnesses of divergence, the D1 period can be 
further divided into two shorter periods (D1a, 1986 –1992 and D1b, 1993-1997), giving us five 
sub-periods.  From figure 2.2, it appears that convergence was associated with the early stages of 
liberalization (C1) and economic crisis (C2), while divergence was observed in the deregulation 
and economic boom era (D1) and in the early implementation of decentralization (D2).  A 
sharper divergence (D1b) was associated with the era of deeper liberalization.   
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Figure 2.2 The trend of coefficient of variation of ln per capita GDP, 1980-2005.  
Source: Author’s creation.  Note: The identification of major economic policies during  
the 1980s and 1990s adopts the Wie (2002) classification.   
 
 
From an economic geography perspective, such a pattern may suggest that the advantages of 
economic liberalization and decentralization disproportionately favor core regions or already 
richer cities (Krugman 1991; Krugman and Elizondo 1996).  In their study of convergence clubs 
at the UK regional level, Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) also find a similar pattern, where 
divergence is more apparent in a period of economic boom.   
 
Is the observed trend of increasing disparities affected by a choice of inequality index?  
Various inequality indices reveal the same pattern: there were increasing disparities over the 
study period.  Figure 2.3 shows that the trend of widening inequality is clearly detected 
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regardless of the inequality measure.
4
  Figure 2.4 focuses on the inequality trend by establishing 
the ratio of the average per capita GDP of the richest cities and the one of the poorest cities.  This 
ratio also tells the same story of greater disparities, but is considerably more effective in 
communicating the inequality trend to general publics, policy makers, and planning agencies.  
The decile dispersion ratio roughly doubled between 1980 and 2005.   
 
Are there distinct sub-periods?  How do they differ?  
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 all suggest that the degree of inequality in the 1990s onward was higher 
than in the former years.  Table 2.1 presents the values of the Gini coefficient in 1980-2005 with 
the jackknife standard errors, the p-value (sig), and the 95% confidence interval; these figures 
highlight two important findings.  First, the measured inequality was highly statistically 
significant in every year of the study period.  Second, it also suggests the same pattern as 
indicated by the three figures; the period of 1993-2005 experienced a higher degree of inequality 
than that of 1980-1992.    
                                               
4
 Table A.1 in the appendix A reports the inequality levels over the years by various inequality measures 
previously reviewed.  
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   Figure 2.3 Inequality trend by Gini, GE measures, and Atkinson’s inequality measures.  
     Source: Author’s creation.  
 
 
 
   Figure 2.4 Inequality trend by decile dispersion ratio, P90/P10.  
     Source: Author’s creation.  
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Table 2.1 The values of Gini coefficient with the jackknife 
                procedure.  
Year Gini Std. err t Sig 95% Conf. Interval 
1980 0.310 0.102 3.03 0.002 0.110 0.510 
1981 0.297 0.098 3.03 0.002 0.105 0.489 
1982 0.303 0.098 3.09 0.002 0.111 0.494 
1983 0.278 0.089 3.13 0.002 0.104 0.452 
1984 0.279 0.089 3.13 0.002 0.104 0.454 
1985 0.278 0.089 3.14 0.002 0.104 0.451 
1986 0.283 0.089 3.16 0.002 0.107 0.458 
1987 0.294 0.095 3.09 0.002 0.107 0.480 
1988 0.299 0.096 3.13 0.002 0.111 0.486 
1989 0.308 0.097 3.18 0.001 0.118 0.498 
1990 0.317 0.096 3.29 0.001 0.128 0.505 
1991 0.320 0.096 3.35 0.001 0.133 0.507 
1992 0.320 0.096 3.35 0.001 0.132 0.507 
1993 0.434 0.120 3.63 0 0.200 0.669 
1994 0.449 0.124 3.62 0 0.206 0.692 
1995 0.461 0.128 3.61 0 0.211 0.711 
1996 0.466 0.128 3.65 0 0.216 0.717 
1997 0.474 0.133 3.55 0 0.213 0.735 
1998 0.481 0.157 3.07 0.002 0.174 0.788 
1999 0.478 0.157 3.04 0.002 0.170 0.786 
2000 0.473 0.155 3.05 0.002 0.169 0.778 
2001 0.490 0.175 2.79 0.005 0.146 0.834 
2002 0.481 0.166 2.9 0.004 0.156 0.807 
2003 0.483 0.166 2.91 0.004 0.157 0.808 
2004 0.486 0.168 2.89 0.004 0.157 0.815 
2005 0.489 0.170 2.88 0.004 0.156 0.823 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 Looking closely at the 95% confidence intervals, two separate periods can be identified: 
the sub-period of 1980-1992 and that of 1993-2005 in which the 95% confidence intervals within 
each sub-period were more congruent.  Further confirmation can be obtained with a two-sample 
t-test to examine whether the levels of inequality in the post-1990s was higher than those pre-
1990s.  As reported in table 2.2, the results of t-test on all three indices support the maintained 
hypothesis.   
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Table 2.2 t-test results on some indices.  
Index Mean Sig for Ha 
Pre-1990s Post-1990s 
Gini 0.299 0.473 0.000 
GE(1) 0.216 0.553 0.000 
A(1) 0.145 0.317 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Note: Ha, the alternative hypothesis, is defined as diff < 0, where  
diff = mean(Pre-1990s) – mean(Post-1990s).  The post-1990s  
covers 1993-2005.  H0, the null hypothesis, is defined as diff = 0.  
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the results of post-hoc Anova.  The tables differ only in the 
number of sub-periods (see the previous discussion on the periodization associated with figure 
2.2).  The Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons test whether the mean difference in the measured 
inequality between the compared periods is statistically significant.  For each comparison, the 
alternative hypothesis is that the average inequality level in period 2 is higher than that in period 
1.   
For the four sub-periods, the results are the same for the defined indices.  The C1 
(representing the observed trend of convergence associated with the early liberalization in 1980-
1985) differed from the C2 (representing the observed trend of convergence associated with the 
economic crisis in 1998-2000).  Both periods indicated a convergence, but the inequality level in 
the C2 was significantly higher than that in the C1.  The C1 was also significantly dissimilar to 
the D2 (representing the observed trend of divergence associated with the post-decentralization 
in 2001-2005), while the D1 (representing the observed trend of divergence associated with the 
deregulation and economic boom era in 1986-1997) differed from the C2 and the D2.  On the 
other hand, the subsequent pattern of the observed trend of convergence and divergence in the 
beginning of the study period (the C1 and D1) and in the end of the study period (the C2 and D2) 
were not significantly different from each other.  This suggests that the average level of 
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inequality in the observed trends of convergence (the C1 and the C2) were not necessarily lower 
than that seen in the observed trends of divergence (the D1 and the D2) that followed 
accordingly.   
 
Table 2.3 Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons, four sub-periods.  
Comparison HSD test 
period 1 vs. period 2 Gini GE(1) A(1) 
C1 D1 3.1175 2.8711 2.984 
C1 C2 7.4718* 8.4846* 7.7000* 
C1 D2 7.8115* 9.7445* 8.3014* 
D1 C2 4.3543* 5.6135* 4.7160* 
D1 D2 4.6940* 6.8734* 5.3174* 
C2 D2 0.3397 1.2599 0.6014 
Source: Author’s calculation.  Note: Periodization derived from 
the pattern of convergence-divergence seen in figure 2.2.  An *  
denotes significant mean difference between two periods.  
 
Table 2.4 Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons, five sub-periods.  
Comparison HSD test 
period 1 vs. period 2 Gini GE(1) A(1) 
C1 D1a 2.5771 1.4846 2.0558 
C1 D1b 28.8587* 27.0915* 29.4350* 
C1 C2 32.4223* 35.9174* 34.7425* 
C1 D2 33.8963* 41.2508* 37.4562* 
D1a D1b 26.2815* 25.6069* 27.3792* 
D1a C2 29.8451* 34.4328* 32.6867* 
D1a D2 31.3191* 39.7662* 35.4004* 
D1b C2 3.5636 8.8259* 5.3076* 
D1b D2 5.0376* 14.1593* 8.0212* 
C2 D2 1.474 5.3334* 2.7137 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Note: Periodization derived from the pattern of convergence- 
divergence seen in figure 2.2.  An * denotes significant mean  
difference between two periods.  
 
 In the scenario of five sub-periods, the D1 is further divided into the D1a (representing 
the flatter trend of divergence associated with the first deregulation era of 1986-1992) and the 
D1b (representing the steeper trend of divergence associated with the deeper liberalization in 
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1993-1997).  In this scenario, the story is generally the same.  Both the D1a and the D1b were 
dissimilar to each other and, according to the GE(1) and A(1) index, to the following trends (i.e., 
the C2 and the D2).  As expected, the D1a (the flatter divergence) did not differ from the C1, but 
the D1b (the steeper divergence) significantly differed from the C1.  All three indices slightly 
disagreed in some comparisons.  According to the Gini coefficient, the pairs that show no 
significant difference are the C1 vs. the D1a, the D1b vs. the C2, and the C2 vs. the D2; while 
according to the A(1) index, such indifferent pairs only include the C1 vs. the D1a and the C2 vs. 
the D2.  According to the GE(1) index, all pairs are significantly different, except the C1 vs. the 
D1a.  
Out of the findings reported in tables 2.2 to 2.4, five highlights emerge.  First, there were 
distinct sub-periods over the observation years, broadly defined as the post-1990s (1993-2005) 
and the pre-1990s (1980-1992).  Periodization can also be made according to the trend of 
convergence or divergence observed within a shorter period.  The alternative periodization has  
four and five sub-periods, respectively.  Second, what is seen as a convergence or a divergence 
may not actually represent a difference in terms of the average level of inequality, as shown by 
the C1 vs. the D1 (or the D1a) and the C2 vs. the D2.  Third, the average level of inequality in a 
convergence trend is not necessarily lower than the one in a divergence, as shown in the D1 vs. 
the C2.  Fourth, two trends of convergence or divergence may be dissimilar, as shown in the C1 
vs. the C2, the D1 vs. the D2, or the D1a vs. the D1b.  Fifth, regardless of the trend (i.e., either 
convergence or divergence), an observed trend in the post-1990s generally reveals a higher 
average level of inequality than an observed trend pre-1990s. 
 These highlights suggest that even while σ-convergence is considered to be a more 
direct test for the convergence hypothesis (Quah 1993), an alternative periodization may yield 
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different stories.  Also, the visual observation of either convergence or divergence should be 
accompanied with a more formal test for mean difference as demonstrated above, because at the 
end, σ-convergence is primarily concerned with the level of dispersion.    
 
2.5 Distribution dynamics 
The σ-convergence approach also needs to describe how the entire shape of the distribution 
evolves (Islam 2003).  Examining the evolution of the entire distribution of a regional per capita 
GDP across cities allows us to explore additional insights regarding the convergence process.  
Because the analysis of distribution dynamics pays attention to the entire cross-sectional 
distribution, and not just its first and second moments, it can reveal a richer pattern that indicates 
polarization or cluster of cities; i.e., convergence club (Quah 1997).  
Measures of disparities are as practical and intuitive as they are relatively easy to 
compute and provide an overall picture of the variance of the cross-section distribution.  
However, they suffer from a limited ability to capture movements of the distribution.  Further, 
the interpretation of dispersion measures may be difficult if the distribution is multimodal 
(Young 2008).  Given the drawback of the summary measures of inequality and the need of 
distribution dynamics analysis, this paper applies a non-parametric approach to the dynamic 
analysis.   
The primary advantage of a non-parametric approach is that it does not constrain its 
estimation to any certain family of distribution and makes no a priori assumptions regarding the 
form of density function.  As such, it avoids some inflexibility or arbitrariness of parametric 
specification (Ahamada and Flachaire 2010).  Particular methods to use are the kernel density 
estimator and Markov chain analysis based on transition probability matrices.  The former is 
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particularly useful in providing a visual description, while the latter can offer some convergence 
statistics to characterize the distribution dynamics.  
 
2.5.1 Kernel density estimator 
Kernel estimation is used to approximate the probability density function (pdf) of a sample of 
observations.  Unlike non-parametric estimates via histogram, kernel estimation produces a 
smooth graphical representation and does not rely on the choice of points of origin.  The naïve 
estimator and kernel density estimator (henceforth, “kernel estimator”) are used in kernel 
estimation.  The kernel estimator is considered a general form of the naïve estimator, so that the 
estimation no longer depends on the number of intervals used, because observations in the 
interval centered on y are not given the same weight.  Rather, the closer the observation is to y, 
the greater the weight given (Ahamada and Flachaire 2010).   
 Following Ahamada and Flachaire (2010), the kernel estimator is given as follows:  
 ̂( )  
 
  
∑  (
    
 
)         (9) 
where n is the sample size and h is the width of the intervals.  The kernel function K must satisfy 
the following condition ∫  ( )    
 
  
, so that  ̂( ) has the properties of a density function.  
This paper chooses the Epanechnikov kernel
5
, expressed as follows:  
 ( )  {
 (  
  
 
)
   
        | |     
                               
   (10) 
 The choice of bandwidth can be problematic.  A too large bandwidth creates over 
smoothing, leading to the loss of some information.  A too small bandwidth produces a spikey 
                                               
5
 According to Silverman (1986), the choice of kernel actually has little effect on the density estimates.  
The Epanechnikov kernel and the Gaussian kernel are the most frequently used kernels. Both are 
symmetric around zero and tail gradually further from zero.   
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density function.  To avoid this dilemma, this paper adopts the Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb 
to find the optimum bandwidth           
      
     
     .  
 
How did the shape of distribution evolve? Were there distinct groups observed?   
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated density function of per capita GDP (in logarithm
6
), taking into 
account some comparisons of the defined periods, where each period is represented by a 
particular year.  Viewed clockwise from the upper left, the figures represent a decade period, a 
comparison of convergence-divergence-convergence years, a period of convergence, and finally 
one of divergence.  Since the variable of interest is expressed in logarithm, a shift represents a 
percentage change in per capita GDP.  As such, the horizontal shift that is evident in figure 2.5 
reflects an overall increase in the level of per capita GDP.  Over the years, the shape of the per 
capita GDP distribution across East Java cities has also changed.   
 In the early 1980s (i.e., 1982 of the first convergence period), the peak was sharper and 
the spread was narrower.  In the mid-80s (i.e., 1985), the density function began to show a 
bimodality, suggesting the existence of two distinct groups.  Such bimodality was much less 
pronounced in the mid-90s (i.e., 1995, 1999), even though the peak was less pointed and the 
spread of density wider, suggesting that the mobility of middle cities to the group of richer cities 
was in the making.  In the post-decentralization era, the density function was bimodal again.  The 
distinction between two groups, the poorer and the richer cities, became sharper.  These two 
distinct groups were not of the same size, as indicated by the different levels of density between 
the two modes.  There were a relatively fewer number of richer cities and a higher number of 
poor cities.   
                                               
6
 Unless otherwise stated, logarithm throughout this paper refers to natural logarithm.  
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Did the gap between the distinct groups persist?  
Figure 2.6 shows the jointly estimated bivariate kernel estimation of per capita GDP in the initial 
and end periods.  The figure describes how the distribution of per capita GDP evolved between 
1980 and 2005.  Evidently, the probability of jointly observing lower values of per capita GDP in 
1980 (X-axis) and 2005 (Y-axis) is considerably high (Z-axis).  A low per capita GDP city in 
1980 had a high chance of remaining a city with relatively low per capita GDP in 2005.  
Similarly, the probability of observing a high per capita GDP city in 1980 become a low value 
city by 2005 is small.  In other words, a city with a relatively higher per capita GDP in 1980 ran 
only a small chance of having a low per capita GDP in 2005.   
In fact, the three clusters of cities were concentrated around the 45-degree line in the X-Y 
plane.  This suggests that the club of poor, middle, and rich cities in 1980 very likely remained 
the same in 2005.  Other methods could possibly yield similar results.  However, the kernel 
density estimation is relatively easy to perform and its graphical output is easy to understand.  
These advantages are favorable, given that not all planning institutions are well-endowed with 
modeling/statistical resources.   
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Figure 2.5 Kernel density estimation.  
Source: Author’s creation.  
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Figure 2.6 Bivariate kernel density estimation.  
Source: Author’s creation.  
 
2.5.2 Markov chain analysis
7
 
A Markov chain is essentially a stochastic process in which the outcome of the next state of the 
system depends only on the present state.  Therefore, Markov chain analysis is used to detect 
mobility within a distribution and to describe its dynamics.  The mobility between n 
states/groups is represented by an n x n matrix, called the transition probability matrix P, also 
                                               
7
 This sub-section avoids a redundant theoretical explanation on Markov process which can be found 
elsewhere in much more detail (e.g., Grinstead and Snell 1997, Chapter 11), but it introduces briefly the 
relevant methodology and draws on Nkurunziza (2010), Monford (2008), and Pellegrini (2002). For 
examples of the application of Markov chain on convergence/regional studies, mostly in a European 
context, see Fingleton (1997), Overman and Puga (2002), and Quah (1996).   
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known as a Markov matrix, a stochastic matrix, or a transition matrix, with elements 
    characterizing the mobility from one state to another, given by:  
    (   )   [ (   )   | ( )   ] (11). 
If the transition is analyzed over more than one period ahead, the transition probability becomes: 
   
( )   [ (   )   | ( )   ]   (12) 
where m is the number of steps.   
Two essential assumptions define the transition probabilities as a time homogenous 
Markov chain, such that    (   )     ( )     : (1) P is constant in time, and (2)     is 
independent of its preceding values.  The properties of the transition probability matrix P 
consists of a series of information regarding the dynamics of the distribution.   
 
Characterizing the distribution dynamics 
If the transition matrix is ergodic
8
, then the chain will converge toward a steady-state and is 
therefore of a stationary distribution.  The speed at which the distribution is supposed to 
converge to this steady-state can be defined as the half-life of the chain: the length of time to 
reach half the distance separating the current distribution from the stationary distribution.  The 
probability of staying in the same group indicates the stability of the process (Pellegrini 2002).  
The half-life h and the Pellegrini’s (2002) stability index S are formulated as: 
   
   ( )
  |  |
       (13) 
                                               
8
 Markov chain is ergodic if it takes a finite number of steps to go from each state to any other 
state, and the absolute value of the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix is strictly 
smaller than 1.  The ergodicity reflects the distribution in the future given the transition process 
P.  
 
45 
 
  
  ( )
 
       (14) 
where    is the second largest eigenvalue and Tr is the trace of the matrix P with dimension n, 
respectively.  A high value of h and S suggest a rapid convergence to the steady-state and a 
stable process respectively.  A stable process indicates a low chance of mobility between 
categories.    
Another way to describe the speed of the transition process is to calculate the mean first 
passage time, defined as how long it takes to move from a state i to another state j.  This is 
described by an n x 1 vector whose elements represent the average time needed for a transit from 
a state to the defined absorbing state.   
Another convergence index can be derived from the transition matrix, indicating whether 
the mobility from the original distribution to the final one increases convergence towards the 
mode of the stationary distribution (Pellegrini 2002).  This index represents the ratio of the sum 
of the probability value in the matrix modal column and in the off-diagonal cells before the 
column to the sum of probabilities in all cells in the matrix.  A higher value for the index 
suggests a lower dispersion in the final distribution and a lower chance for polarization (i.e., the 
occurrence of multiple modes) in the long-run distribution.
9
  
 
How persistent are the inequality dynamics? How fast is the convergence?  
Given the defined five non-overlapping classes of per capita GDP,
10
 the transition probability 
matrix over the study period is given by table 2.5 and its characteristics are presented in table 
                                               
9
 This stationary distribution can be computed as fixed factor w, such that (   )   ; thus, w is the 
left null space of the matrix (   ) (Grinstead and Snell 1997).  
10
 The defined categories are made slightly lower than the overall dispersion for all years, indicated by the 
six-number summary (min, max, mean, median, and Q1 and Q3). Two alternative categorizations are the 
one that is made around and one that is slightly higher than the overall dispersion. The Markov chain 
46 
 
2.6.  Table 2.5 shows that the distribution exhibits a high degree of persistence.  The diagonal 
values (i.e., the grey shaded cells) are high, indicating a high probability of staying in the same 
group.  Such inertia is summarized by a high value of the stability index S (0.82), indicating that 
the process is highly stable.  
 
Table 2.5 Transition probability matrix.  
 per capita GDP (in thousand Rp.), 2005 
 Classes < 500 500 - 700 701 - 900 901 - 1500 > 1500 
 < 500 90.3% 4.9% 3.5% 1.4% 0.0% 
 500 – 700 0.0% 73.6% 18.1% 5.6% 2.8% 
1980 701 – 900 0.0% 0.8% 77.2% 7.9% 14.2% 
   901 – 1500 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 80.0% 17.1% 
 > 1500 12.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 87.1% 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
However, some upward mobility is expected, and is more pronounced particularly in the 
middle classes of the distribution.  About 18% of the second poorest cities in 1980 were expected 
to move up to the next group in 2005.  Over the same period, 14% of the central class cities (i.e., 
the 701-900 class) were expected to jump up to the top class cities (i.e., the > 1500 class) while 
17% of the second richest cities were expected to become the richest cities.  Interestingly, while 
12% of the richest cities in 1980 were expected to fall into the group of the poorest cities in 
2005, all cities in fact remained in the top category in 2005, given the very wide range within the 
top category.
11
 At the stationary distribution, it is expected that approximately 40% of the cities 
will belong to the lowest category and 30% of them will be in the top category, while less than 
                                                                                                                                                       
result according to the alternative groupings is presented in the tables A.2 and A.4 in the appendix A.  It 
yields similar dynamic characteristics.  
11
 Recall that Markov process is a stochastic process, which is explained by a mathematical model that 
evolves over time in a probabilistic fashion.  
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one third of the cities will be spread out over the three middle groups (table 2.6).  As such, it is 
consistent with the pattern emerged in the bivariate kernel estimation (figure 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6 Dynamic characteristics.  
Stationary Distribution 
per capita GDP, Classes Share of population 
< Rp. 500,000 38% 
Rp. 500,000 - Rp. 700,000 7% 
Rp. 701,000 - Rp. 900,000 13% 
Rp. 901,000 - Rp. 1,500,000 11% 
> Rp. 1,500,000 30% 
Convergence Statistics 
Half-life 3.9 periods 
S 0.82 
C_the 3rd 0.24 
C_the 4th 0.28 
Mean First Passage Time 
Class Mobility MFPT (years) 
From class 1 to class 4 36.8 
From class 2 to class 4 30.1 
From class 3 to class 4 31.8 
From class 5 to class 4 42.6 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Taking the third and fourth group as the absorbing state, the indices of convergence 
toward these two classes (i.e., the C_the 3
rd
 and the C_the 4
th
) take the low values of 0.24 and 
0.28, respectively.  The low values indicate a higher probability of dispersion and polarization in 
the final distribution, which is evident graphically and in the stationary distribution statistics.   
Provided the process is highly stable, it appears that the observed distribution is nowhere 
near the steady-state distribution, as captured by the half-life index that takes a value of 3.9, 
which is higher than unitary.  The system resistance is also indicated by the mean first passage 
time.  All upward mobility from a lower state to the defined absorbing state (i.e., the fourth class) 
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was expected to take more than 30 years.  The much longer mean first passage time is found for 
an alternative categorization that defines a set of higher intervals (tables A.3 and A.5 in the 
appendix A).  
This sub-section is able to characterize inequality dynamics, as described visually in the 
previous sub-section.  All these findings are consistent with or support the kernel density 
estimation and tell the same story.  The observed inequality and some polarization are expected 
to remain, even though some upward mobility is also pronounced in the process toward the 
steady-state.  Other things equal, the system is remarkably stable.  Different methods of class 
categorization provide similar results; the only notable exception is the higher number of years in 
mean first passage time in the alternative categorization, which only further highlights the 
stability of the system.   
 
2.6 β-convergence 
This section tests the β-convergence hypothesis, adopting the widely used Barro and Sala-i-
Martin’s equation developed from the Solow-Swan long-run growth model (Arbia 2005):   
 
 
   (
   
    
)    
(      )
 
   (    )       (15) 
where      (               ) denotes per capita GDP at time t and city i,   is a constant, 
and   is the error term with zero mean.  By setting    (      ), equation (15) can be 
estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) and rewritten as:  
   (
   
    
)        (    )         (16) 
where the dependent variable    (
   
    
) denotes the city i’s growth rate for the entire period and 
the covariate    (    ) represents the logarithm of the city i’s per capita GDP in the initial 
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period.  If the estimated  ̂ in equation (16) is significant and  ̂   , the data favor the 
unconditional/absolute β-convergence.  To test for a conditional β-convergence hypothesis that 
incorporates some other predictors in a panel data setting, equation (16) can be rewritten as:  
   (
      
    
)         (    )                (17) 
where       is a vector of k additional cities’ characteristics and controls for cross-city 
heterogeneity in determinants of the city’s steady state.  Where m=1, the dependent variable 
   (
      
    
) is the annual growth rate of the per capita GDP of the East Java cities and    (    ) 
is the logarithm value of the city i’s per capita GDP at the beginning of each period over which 
the annual growth rate is computed.  Thus, the equation (17) implies that the dependent variable 
is regressed on the lagged values of the right-hand side variables.  This specification has the 
advantage of addressing the potential endogeneity issue and is also used in Higgins et al. (2006).   
The verdict will be the conditional β-convergence if the estimated  ̂ is negative and statistically 
different from zero.  Two parameters govern the convergence process: first, the speed of 
convergence     
   (   ̂)
 
, and second, the half-life time   
    ( )
 
 .  The parameter b 
represents the annual rate of convergence, while the parameter h represents the time needed to be 
half-way between the initial value and the steady-state.
12
  
Both the absolute and conditional β-convergence hypotheses suggest that poor cities or 
regions grow faster than rich ones.  However, the hypotheses differ in the final point of 
convergence.  While the absolute β-convergence suggests that all economies converge to the 
same level of per capita GDP, the conditional β-convergence argues the economies converge to 
                                               
12
 A steady-state refers to a situation where the growth rates of all variables are constant (Arbia 2005).  
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their own steady states.  This paper finds evidence in favor for the conditional β-convergence 
hypothesis, but no evidence for the absolute β-convergence hypothesis.  
 
2.6.1 Absolute β-convergence 
 Equation (16) is first estimated via OLS, then via maximum likelihood (ML).  Table 2.7 
presents these results.  The estimation is done on the dataset that consists of 37 cross-sectional 
units and of three period types: 1) the entire period (1983-2005), 2) the first-half period (1983-
1992), and 3) the second-half period (1993-2005).  All three models fail to support the absolute 
β-convergence hypothesis.  The 1983-2005 and the 1983-1992 models do not support the 
absolute β-convergence, but instead show significant divergence.  The negative sign of the 1993-
2005 model’s estimated coefficient indicates convergence, but it is not significant.  The 
estimated coefficients by both OLS and ML are the same, but the ML estimates’ standard errors 
are generally smaller than those produced by OLS.  In terms of goodness of fit (looking at the 
AIC, BIC, and log-likelihood statistics), the OLS and ML models are considered the same.  
However, the ML method is to be considered more efficient and does not suffer from assumption 
violations facing the OLS estimates.  
The striking finding is that both methods of estimation reveal the same story: absolute β-
convergence is not evident.  Instead, the richer cities grew faster than the poorer ones during the 
study period.  From an arithmetical stand point, it is possible to further calculate the speed of 
“divergence,” because the positive sign of the coefficient.  However, from an economics point of 
view, and considering the process of how b is derived from equation (15), the computed speed of 
“divergence” is difficult to interpret.  The same reasoning applies to why half-life “divergence” 
is not calculated either for the test for the absolute β-convergence hypothesis.  
 
51 
 
Table 2.7 Absolute β-convergence, OLS and ML 
  1983-2005   1983-1992   1993-2005 
  OLS ML   OLS ML   OLS ML 
initial per capita GDP 0.3804 0.3804 
 
0.1147 0.1147 
 
-0.0219 -0.0219 
  (.1221)** (.1216)** 
 
(.02651)*** (.02434)*** (0.06814) (0.08668) 
intercept -2.184 -2.184 
 
-1.066 -1.066 
 
1.727 1.727 
  (1.559) (1.534) 
 
(.3385)** (.3091)*** 
 
(0.9558) (1.198) 
N 37 37   37 37   37 37 
AIC 25.17 27.17 
 
-87.85 -85.85 
 
10.65 12.65 
BIC 28.39 32 
 
-84.63 -81.02 
 
13.87 17.48 
R-sq 0.2171 
  
0.3486 
  
0.002944                 
F 9.704 
  
18.73 
  
0.1034                 
Log-likelihood -10.59 -10.59   45.93 45.93   -3.325 -3.325 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: Author’s estimation.  
  
2.6.2 Conditional β-convergence 
Since the Barro’s approach is essentially developed from the Solow-Swan’s framework, 
while making use of the Cobb-Douglas production function (Arbia 2005), the stocks of public, 
private, and human capital, and other types of infrastructure are regarded important determinants 
of regional economic growth (Lall and Yilmaz 2001).  Therefore, testing the conditional β-
convergence hypothesis can be devised by estimating equation (17), which incorporates variables 
representing factors, policies affecting factor mobility, and other regional’s characteristics.  This 
paper employs various measures of human capital, a measure of government spending, and an 
interaction between the government spending at the city and the city’s fiscal capacity category.   
Table 2.8 presents the estimation result of six models (mod1 to mod6).  The six models 
differ only by the measures of human capital (see the note below table 2.8 for additional variable 
descriptions).  All six models are similar in terms of goodness of fit and they tell a consistent 
story.  The feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimations in all models support the 
conditional β-convergence hypothesis for the entire period (1983-2005).   
52 
 
As expected, all human capital proxies are significant and promote growth in all six 
models.  This means that the per capita GDP in the cities highly endowed with human capital 
should grow faster.  Compared with other human capital measures, the ratio of people with 
diploma degrees to the total population (mod5) has the largest impact on growth, followed by the 
ratio of the number of people with university degrees to the working-age population (mod6).  It 
may reflect a situation where vocational trainings are more favorable to local economic 
development.   
 
Table 2.8 The FGLS estimations on the conditional β-convergence hypothesis, 1983-2005.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  mod1 mod2 mod3    mod4 mod5 mod6    
per capita GDP -0.09233 -0.08933 -0.09979 -0.09584 -0.07473 -0.04794 
 
(.01793)*** (.01778)*** (.01835)*** (.01815)*** (.01692)*** (.01508)**  
human capital 1.426 0.9483 1.939 1.28 18.2 3.027 
 
(.2603)*** (.1774)*** (.3353)*** (.228)*** (3.88)*** (.9208)**  
government spending 0.0338 -0.1396 0.02082 -0.1729 -0.136 0.0569 
 
(0.3968) (0.3981) (0.396) (0.3977) (0.3998) (0.4017) 
low fiscal capacity X -2.427 -2.112 -2.605 -2.245 -1.46 -1.26 
government spending (1.191)* (1.178) (1.193)*   (1.179) (1.162) (1.174) 
intercept 1.104 1.098 1.177 1.164 0.9281 0.6777 
 
(.2287)*** (.2305)*** (.2316)*** (.2332)*** (.2213)*** (.2112)**  
N 814 814 814 814 814 814 
AIC 350.1 351.5 346.8 348.7 357.9 368.9 
BIC 387.7 389.1 384.4 386.3 395.5 406.5 
Log-likelihood -167.1 -167.8 -165.4 -166.3 -170.9 -176.4 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: Author’s estimation.  
Notes: The measures of human capital for model 1-6 (mod1-mod6) are defined as follows:  
mod1 = ratio of the number of people with high school, diploma, and university degree to the total 
population; mod2 = ratio of the number of people with high school, diploma, and university degree to the 
working-age population; mod3 = ratio of the number of people with high school degree to the total 
population; mod4 = ratio of the number of people with high school degree to the working-age population; 
mod5 = ratio of the number of people with diploma degree to the total population; mod6= ratio of the 
number of people with university degree to the working-age population.  The government spending is 
measured as the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP.   
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Government spending is not significant in all models.  The employed measure of 
government spending only covers the consumption expenditures, therefore it does not represent 
public capital or investment, which this paper is currently lacking of and which is expected to 
have positive impact.  It is not clear from the evidence whether the city governments’ 
consumption spending behavior is growth enhancing or simply due to waste.  However, there is 
an indication and some significant evidence that higher consumption expenditure by the low-
fiscally capable cities is detrimental to growth.   
Table 2.9 provides estimates of the convergence speed and half-life and their 
corresponding 95% confidence interval resulted from the percentile and bias-corrected 
bootstraps.  The 95% confidence interval by both bootstraps is very similar, indicating that the 
estimates are unbiased.  Across the models, the speed of convergence is very low (i.e., less than 
0.5% annually).  Accordingly, it might take more than a century for East Java cities to reach even 
the half-way point toward their steady states.  This result is consistent with the convergence 
statistics resulting from the Markov chain analysis in section 2.5.2, where both suggest the 
persistence of disparities between East Java cities.   
With all favorable economic conditions and government actions along the way to the 
steady state, the poor cities’ ultimate steady state may actually put them closer to that of the rich 
cities’.  However, it is difficult to tell when the steady state will be achieved and what levels of 
development or any other welfare indicators associated will be associated with the steady state.  
Until then, the clusters of poor and rich cities will stubbornly persist.  
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Table 2.9 The convergence speed and half-life of the conditional β-convergence.  
Model 
Speed of convergence   Half-life (year) 
Estimate 95% Conf. Interval   Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
mod1 0.44% 0.27% - 0.65%  (P) 
 
157.42 107.42 - 258.83  (P) 
  
0.29% - 0.66%  (BC) 
  
105.05 - 241.33  (BC) 
mod2 0.43% 0.27% - 0.63%  (P) 
 
162.97 109.42 - 256.22  (P) 
  
0.28% - 0.64%  (BC) 
  
108.47 - 247.79  (BC) 
mod3 0.48% 0.32% - 0.68%  (P) 
 
145.06 101.30 - 217.98  (P) 
  
0.32% - 0.71%  (BC) 
  
97.68 - 216.21  (BC) 
mod4 0.46% 0.30% - 0.67%  (P) 
 
151.36 102.92 - 230.10  (P) 
  
0.31% - 0.68%  (BC) 
  
102.52 - 224.26  (BC) 
mod5 0.35% 0.23% - 0.54%  (P) 
 
196.34 127.82 - 304.08  (P) 
  
0.23% - 0.54%  (BC) 
  
127.82 - 304.08  (BC) 
mod6 0.22% 0.12% - 0.38%  (P) 
 
310.39 181.87 - 559.70  (P) 
    0.12% - 0.41%  (BC)     170.25 - 558.70  (BC) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: P=percentile bootstraps; B=bias-corrected bootstraps.   
 
2.6.3 Is there a spatial problem?  
An answer to this question is important from both theoretical and empirical stand points.  Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 382) state that “absolute convergence is more likely to apply across 
regions within countries than across countries” because the differences in technology, 
preferences, and institutions are supposed to be smaller than those across countries.  Given no 
evidence of absolute convergence as previously explained, do the data show the absence of some 
spatial spillovers?  From a methodological point of view, if spatial autocorrelation is present, the 
estimation needs to devise spatial models.  Otherwise, the parameters will not be consistently 
estimated (Rey and Montouri 1999).  The three following approaches agree that is there is no 
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evidence of spatial autocorrelation: 1) Global statistics
13
 of Moran’s I and Geary’C; 2) Visual 
inspection via Moran scatter plot; and 3) Lagrange multiplier diagnostics for spatial dependence.    
 The respective formula for Moran’s I and Geary’C is:  
  
∑ ∑ (    ̅)(    ̅)     
∑ (    ̅)  
 
  
∑ ∑ (     )
 
     
∑ (    ̅)  
 
where     is an element of spatial weight matrix W.  Moran’s contiguity ratio takes a value of  
I ϵ [-1, 1].  A value of zero indicates no spatial autocorrelation, while a negative or positive value 
suggests neighboring places are dissimilar or similar to each other.  The Geary’s ratio takes a 
value of C ϵ [0, 2] and its expected value is 1 for no spatial autocorrelation.  A value of C > 1 
indicates negative autocorrelation, while a value of C < 1 suggests positive autocorrelation 
(Fotheringham et al. 2000).  Under randomization tests for both statistics, the magnitudes of 
spatial autocorrelation statistics are very small and are not significant (table 2.10).  The visual 
inspections as shown in figures 2.7 and 2.8 support the tests.  
 
Table 2.10 The statistics of spatial autocorrelation.  
Year 
Spatial autocorrelation 
Moran's I p-value Geary's C p-value 
1980 0.031 0.200 0.590 0.072 
1982 0.032 0.198 0.590 0.072 
1989 0.020 0.248 0.603 0.079 
1995 0.039 0.170 0.589 0.073 
1999 0.014 0.232 0.597 0.087 
2003 0.021 0.208 0.589 0.079 
2005 0.020 0.212 0.589 0.080 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
                                               
13
 LISA (local indicators for spatial autocorrelation) tests are also performed and the results are the same 
with the one provided by the global statistics, i.e., no spatial dependence is detected.   
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Figure 2.7 Moran scatter plot, 2005.  
Source: Author’s creation.  
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Figure 2.8 Moran scatter plot, 1980.  
Source: Author’s creation.  
 
 Finally, Lagrange multiplier diagnostics for spatial dependence applied on the model 1 
in table 2.9 (mod1) further confirm the absence of spatial dependence (table 2.11).  Thus, we can 
conclude with confidence that there is no spatial problem.  Therefore, there is no need to estimate 
spatial lag model,   (
    
    
)        (    )       (
    
    
)    , and spatial error 
model,   (
    
    
)        (    )  (    )
     (Rey and Montouri 1999).   
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Table 2.11: Spatial dependence diagnostics.  
 
1983 2005 
Test Stat p-value Stat p-value 
LMlag 0.0836 0.7724 0.392 0.5313 
LMerr 1.039 0.308 1.9521 0.1624 
RLMlag 1.0033 0.3165 0.9471 0.3305 
RLMerr 1.9587 0.1617 2.5072 0.1133 
SARMA 2.0423 0.3602 2.8992 0.2347 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
2.7 Conclusion and policy implication 
This paper provides evidence for the increasing level of disparities within the study period.  The 
observed increasing trend of inequality is robust to the choice of one measure over another.  The 
level of inequality was significantly higher in the 1990s, often characterized as the high growth 
period associated with major economic and policy events, such as deeper liberalization, 
economic crisis, and decentralization.  
Even though the mid-90s witnessed some mobility of the middle cities to the richer 
group, bimodality became sharper again in the post-decentralization.  Analysis on the 
distribution dynamics indicate the strong presence of clubs and such polarization is expected to 
remain, all else remaining equal, given the high stability of the transition process.  A scenario of 
upward mobility may take at least three decades.    
A catching-up process is detected, but it is very slow and only occurs when city’s 
characteristics thought to be determinants of growth are taken into account.  In other words, the 
absolute β-convergence hypothesis, which often said to be more likely to occur across regions 
within a country, does not get its empirical support in this research.  Instead, what shows up in 
the data is a tendency of divergence, by which the already richer cities consistently outgrew the 
poorer ones in the study period.  However, after controlling for some cities’ characteristics, such 
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a catching-up process appears.  The presence of divergence force in the absolute β-convergence 
hypothesis and the slow convergence process in the conditional β-convergence hypothesis, along 
with the absence of spatial spillovers, may be responsible for the widening disparities and the 
sustained gap between the rich and the poor cities.   
The findings suggest that the old wisdom saying that East Java is a case of “balanced 
development” does not hold, at least from the perspective of spatial inequality.  Since the focus 
of this investigation is on the measurement and characterization of convergence dynamics and 
not a welfare analysis, this chapter does not offer specific policy recommendations with regard to 
spatial inequality.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in general, proposed policy responses 
should be evaluated with regard to their effects on spatial disparities, on the one hand, and 
influences on the benefits of agglomeration, on the other hand.  In addition, the benefits of 
various policy options should be weighed against costs.  Such analysis is beyond the scope of 
this current analysis. 
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Chapter 3  
Regional Income Disparities in Decentralizing Indonesia, 2001-2007 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The extraordinary circumstances of the crisis in 1998 drove Indonesia to pursue a ‘big bang’ 
approach to decentralization by embarking on administrative, fiscal, and political 
decentralization at the same time.  While Indonesia’s 2001 decentralization might be at first a 
very politically-motivated policy response to such regional resentments as separatist tendencies 
or grievances of resource-rich regions (Booth 2003; World Bank 2003), Indonesia’s 
decentralization should also be regarded as a policy tool to address market-led agglomeration 
and persistent interregional inequality (Arze del Granado 2009).  
The decentralization framework is applied at the district level.  Therefore, Indonesia’s 
decentralization can be regarded as a radical reform, considering that: 1) Indonesia is a multi-tier 
unitary state with subnational governments consisting of provincial and district governments 
(kabupaten and kota);
1
 and 2) Indonesia had been highly centralized since the 1950s, the post-
1945 independence period has witnessed several attempts of both regional-based and 
ideology/religious-driven rebellion.  
The applied fiscal decentralization attempted to promote equalization by addressing 
vertical and horizontal imbalances and to provide district governments with incentives for 
development.  One important research issue is then to investigate whether the Indonesian 
decentralization delivered on its equity promise.  More specifically, this paper addresses the 
                                                             
1
 Administratively, districts can be kota (city) or kabupaten (regency), but they are on the same level, i.e. 
district level. This paper refers ‘local governments’ or ‘local levels’ to district level. In this paper, ‘region’ 
or ‘regional’ in general refer to subnational level (in Indonesian context, it includes provinces, districts, or 
any other regional groupings whenever applicable).   
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questions whether 1) there has been a reduction in income disparities across districts; 2) the 
decentralization is an inequality-reducing force; and 3) the impact of decentralization on 
inequality is moderated by the districts’ level of development, or in other words, how the 
districts’ level of development may have an influence on the effect of decentralization on 
inequality.  
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between decentralization and regional 
disparities presented in both single-country studies (e.g., Akai and Sakata 2005; Bonet 2006) and 
cross-country studies (e.g., Ezcurra and Pascual 2008; Canaleta et al. 2004) are inconclusive.  It 
seems that the decentralization process may operate differently in the developed and developing 
regions/economies.  Hence, one of the primary purposes of this paper is to investigate how the 
level of development of individual districts may affect the impact of decentralization on 
inequality across Indonesian districts.  A review of the literature reveals that there has been no 
study of the Indonesian decentralization case that has empirically investigated this issue at 
district level.  Some unpublished work mainly focuses on the impact of decentralization on 
growth but these are all at the provincial level (with a shorter study period, e.g. 2001-2003), they 
only rely on a single indicator for the decentralization, and they do not control for the interaction 
between the level of development and the decentralization.  
Previous studies on regional income disparities in Indonesia also rely on provincial data 
(e.g., Akita and Lukman 1995; García García and Soelistianingsih 1998), so the sample is small 
and it does not allow a within province inequality analysis.  On decomposition analysis, this 
paper applies a more flexible and unrestrictive approach suggested by Mookherjee and Shorrocks 
(1982) in subgrouping the Indonesian districts, so it takes a departure from the rigid hierarchical 
structure approach used by Akita and Alisjahbana (2002).  
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This paper fills a gap in the absence of studies on the inequality-decentralization in 
Indonesia.  Compared with previous studies, this paper offers several novelties.  First, it 
combines both extensive descriptive, decomposition and econometric analysis, exploiting a panel 
dataset of the Indonesian districts during the period 2001-2007.  Secondly, it constructs several 
proxies for decentralization rather than relying on a single indicator.  Thirdly, it investigates the 
interaction effects between the level of development and the decentralization.  Fourthly, the 
fixed-effect estimations also address endogeneity and control for heteroscedasticity.  
This research finds that there has been a decrease in inequality across Indonesian districts 
due to the reduction in within and between province inequalities.  The observed reduction in 
equality is in general associated with greater fiscal decentralization by most proxies, but there is 
limited evidence of the inequality-promoting force of the tax-based revenue sharing.  The 
districts’ level of development is found to be a significant determinant of the observed inequality 
and a significant moderator of the effect of a decentralization indicator on inequality. 
Development spending, the manufacturing sector, infrastructure, and urban concentration are 
found to be significant equalizing forces.  The results of this research will provide important 
inputs into the evaluation of policies addressing Indonesia’s regional disparities.    
The next section discusses the link between decentralization and regional income 
disparities.  Section 3.3 summarizes Indonesia’s decentralization framework, while section 3.4 
presents the descriptive and decomposition analysis.  Section 3.5 outlines the model 
specifications for the empirical analysis and section 3.6 presents the estimation results.  Section 
3.7 concludes the paper.  
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3.2 The link between decentralization and regional income disparities 
The main arguments in favor of decentralization have been based on efficiency and equity 
perspectives.  From an efficiency perspective, Oates (1972) posits that local governments are 
better informed about and have better capacity to meet local preferences and needs.  Therefore, 
the transfer of authority and resources to subnational governments can improve allocative 
efficiency (i.e., the efficiency of allocation of resources).  Interregional mobility of individuals to 
locate in the places that offer a bundle of public services and taxes that best match their interests 
(Tiebout 1956) further enhances efficiency gains.  Oates (1999) argues that people mobility may 
result in competition and policy innovations among local governments.  It will ultimately create 
a more efficient provision of public goods and services and an increasing overall productive 
efficiency in the economy.  From an equity perspective, that is the focus of this current paper; 
regional autonomy is a policy instrument to address persistent regional disparities, considered as 
a fertile ground for economic, social, and political problems (Tselios et al. 2012).  Transfer of 
resources by some redistribution criteria can correct some horizontal imbalances among 
subnational entities.  Fiscal decentralization with an adequate transfer system can improve 
development in lagging regions and finally promote interregional equity (Bonet 2006).  
 Efficiency and equity perspectives are related to each other.  As decentralization will 
promote efficiency for the whole economy and assuming that more developed regions are closer 
to their economic efficiency frontier, then less developed regions will enjoy a greater margin of 
improvement.  In this regard, decentralization acts as an inequality-reducing force.  As less 
developed regions may be in greater need for fiscal competition and flexible labor markets, they 
may have a greater incentive to deliver public goods and services and to achieve levels of 
development similar to those of more developed regions, or at least to some minimum standard 
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of performance or service.  Under these circumstances, decentralization acts as a wealth or living 
standard-equalizing force (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010).  
 However, there are also circumstances under which decentralization may increase 
regional disparities.  Potential costs associated with different institutional capacities, governance 
quality, and social-economic endowment across regions may outweigh the potential benefits of 
decentralization associated with better knowledge of local preferences and local economic 
potential (i.e., allocative and productive efficiencies).  The loss of scale economies in policy 
formulation and delivery and the increased ‘rent seeking’ and the stronger ‘local capture’ by 
interest groups at the local levels may instead deliver goods and services in much less efficient 
ways as well as divert resources from productive uses or reduce resources allocated for welfare-
enhancing activities (Prud’homme 1995).  According to Azis (2008), local capture is both 
inefficient and inequitable.  It manifests itself in local budgets that may be used for economically 
unviable or socially undesirable projects, taking away funds from other important ones with 
higher public values.   
Poorer and less well-endowed regions generally face greater institutional constraints and 
thus are more exposed to the potential costs of decentralization.  This situation will make the 
lagging regions less able to attract capital, investment, or skilled workers, which in turn will 
make them less able to innovate and compete with more developed regions.  Under these 
circumstances, regional disparities can be perpetuated and even widen (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra 2010).  
As explained, the link between fiscal decentralization to regional disparities or income 
inequality could go through multiple channels.  The characteristics of fiscal decentralization in 
place, the extent of effective autonomy in collecting revenue and spending exercised by sub-
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national governments, and the quality of governance also play an important role.  Two opposing 
arguments are the one that is skeptical about the redistribution functions being conducted by 
local governments versus the one that recognizes the important roles of sub-national 
governments carrying out redistributive policies (Prud’homme 1995).  If the sub-central 
governments are implementing redistributive policies, depending on the degree of fiscal 
autonomy, sub-national governments may be able to do it through progressive taxation on the 
revenue side of the budget and/or through pro-poor spending policies on the expenditure side of 
the budget.  Spending behavior is also an important factor that affects the decentralization-
inequality relationship.  If a greater spending autonomy would only increase government 
officers’ salaries instead of spending for productive infrastructure, decentralization could lead to 
widening regional disparities, as in the case of Colombia (Bonet 2006).   
 As in the theoretical discussion on the link between decentralization and regional 
disparities, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the two is also 
inconclusive.  Single-country studies confine results within an experience of a particular country, 
but they are less problematic in controlling for institutional differences and other peculiarities 
than multi-country studies.  The typical findings are that decentralization reduces territorial 
disparities in developed economies (Canaleta et al. 2004), but it has the opposite effects for less 
developed economies (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010).  Two possible reasons are: 1) in 
developed economies, sub-national governments are arguably more able to play a role in 
balancing resources; and 2) stronger territorial competition due to greater mobility across 
jurisdictions provides greater incentives for sub-national governments in developed countries to 
meet the residents’ preferences.   
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Single-country studies (e.g., Bonet 2006 for Colombia, Qiao et al. 2008 for China, and 
Kim et al. 2003 for Korea) find that the estimated sign of the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
regional disparities is positive, meaning that decentralization is found to be associated with 
widening inequality.  Other studies (e.g., Akai and Sakata 2005 for the USA and Calamai 2009 
for Italy) find that the estimated sign is negative, suggesting that decentralization is an 
inequality-reducing force.  Of cross-country studies, Ezcurra and Pascual (2008) for EU 
countries and Canaleta et al. (2004) for 17 OECD countries find a negative relationship between 
decentralization and regional disparities, while Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004) using a sample 
of both developed and developing countries provide mixed evidence, depending on the 
countries’ level of development 
For the Indonesian case, McCulloch and Sjahrir (2008) investigate the growth impact of 
the decentralization at provincial level and at a shorter period of time.  Resosudarmo et al. 
(1999), using the 1996 Indonesian inter-regional computable general equilibrium model 
(IRCGE), study the impact of some intergovernmental transfers on income distribution among 
islands in Indonesia.  The ‘fiscal decentralization framework’ in this study is an earmarked 
intergovernmental transfer system through regional grants (e.g., INPRES, DIP) allocated through 
sectoral ministries.  Some grants under the framework were even more limited where the 
investment location was predetermined by the central government.   
 
3.3 Background: Decentralization in Indonesia 
Indonesia is part of the global trend towards decentralization since the 1970s (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Gill 2004).  Davoodi and Zou (1998) observe that 63 out of 75 developing and transitional 
countries with populations greater than five million have undergone some forms of power 
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transfer from central government to lower government tiers.  Prud’homme (1995) defines 
decentralization as power and/or resource transfers from central to subnational government and 
outlines three types of administrative decentralization, namely: 1) deconcentration, that is 
redistribution of decision making to regional governments; 2) delegation, by which a semi-
autonomous organization will have a closer involvement on policy making; and 3)  devolution, 
through which a lower autonomous government tier has some degree of power or even full 
degree of power in some policy areas.  Administrative decentralization is generally accompanied 
by fiscal decentralization, broadly defined as decentralization of financial resources through an 
intergovernmental transfer system or a revenue sharing mechanism.  Indonesia’s post-1998 
decentralization encompasses three types of administration decentralization and fiscal 
decentralization. 
With respect to fiscal decentralization, empirical studies suggest that the stage of 
development, the size of the country, the population diversity, and the ‘crisis effect’ are primary 
driving forces for fiscal decentralization (Bahl and Linn 1992).  These forces also appear to drive 
Indonesia to embark on a decentralization strategy.  Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
Indonesia was regarded as the next ‘Asian Tigers’ or one of the ‘Asian Miracles’.2  Indonesia’s 
development features at that time (i.e., consistent high economic growth during the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, accompanied with much improved social-economic indicators yet with 
relatively high inequalities among regions) made Indonesia a good candidate for 
decentralization.  With a large population and high cultural diversity, decentralization would 
allow the Government of Indonesia (GOI) to take into account regional differences and to meet 
the local preferences in better ways, a central argument in fiscal decentralization theorem laid out 
                                                             
2
 These terms refer to the following economies: South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
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by Oates (1972).  Finally, the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997, followed by a political 
crisis in 1998 and afterwards (e.g., turmoil and the resurgence of separatism tendencies in such 
provinces as Aceh, Papua, and East Timor
3
) and the subsequent downfall of the Soeharto regime 
seemed to accelerate the process of decentralization (Silver et al. 2001).  
 Such acceleration process led to the enactment of Law 22/1999 on Local Government 
and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Local 
Governments that frame Indonesia’s administrative and fiscal decentralization strategy.  After a 
two-year timeline for preparation, Indonesia entered a new era of regional autonomy
4
 in January 
1, 2001 when the 1999 Laws came into effect.  Both Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999 replaced 
Law 5/1974 on the Principles of Regional Government.  The 1999 laws grant district 
governments a considerably greater degree and larger scope of autonomy; in addition, it 
restructured the system of intergovernmental transfers to empower local economic capabilities. 
Despite a mild success, the rushed preparation for a quite radical change in devolution of 
authority and fiscal decentralization necessitated revision on the original laws to improve the 
clarity of intergovernmental relations or district obligatory functions that will finally ensure 
smooth implementation.  Amendment to the 1999 laws yields Law 32/2004 on Regional 
Autonomy and Law 33/2004 on Regional Finance.  
Many also view Indonesia’s 2001 decentralization as a ‘Big Bang’ (e.g., World Bank 
2003), because: 1) Indonesia has simultaneously embarked on administrative, fiscal, and political 
decentralization; 2) The new intergovernmental fiscal system shifts away from the earmarked 
                                                             
3
 Indeed, East Timor earned its independence after a 1999 referendum.  
 
4
 Indonesians also widely use the term regional autonomy for decentralization.  This paper uses the terms 
interchangeably.  
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grants
5
 largely determined by the Central government to a general allocation fund. All in all, 
Indonesia’s 2001 decentralization has rapidly transformed Indonesia to one the most 
decentralized systems in the world from one of the most centralized ones.  
 
3.3.1 Devolution of authority 
Law 22/1999 devolves much of the responsibility to the district level by assigning authority in 
obligatory sectors that include public works, health, education, agriculture, transport, industry 
and trade, capital investment, infrastructure services, environment, land, cooperatives, and 
manpower.  The central government remains responsible for monetary and fiscal policies, 
international relations, national defense, justice, security, and religion affairs.  Even though the 
Law explicitly states that there is no hierarchical relationship between province and its districts, 
each of the provincial governments coordinates district governments within its territory and 
performs functions that affect more than one district government or, by a district government’s 
request, undertakes functions that the district government is yet unable to do so, as long as those 
functions are not part of the obligatory sectors (e.g., the de-concentrated tasks of line ministries 
at the district level).  Each provincial governor (i.e., the head of the provincial government) 
remains the representative of the central government in the regions and administers the de-
concentrated central tasks (World Bank 2003).   
Law 32/2004 improves the clarity of obligatory functions for both district and provincial 
level and of the supervisory power of provincial governments over district governments.  To 
improve accountability, Law 32/2004 also introduces elections for the subnational heads, i.e., 
governors at the provincial level and walikota/bupati for district level (World Bank 2007).  Law 
                                                             
5
 Resosudarmo et al. (1999) evaluate the earmarked programs, such as Project Allocation List (Daftar 
Isian Proyek, DIP), and show that some of which were mere transfer with no change in allocation by 
provincial government.   
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32/2004 urges a better planning coordination where the national planning should take the 
provincial and district planning into account, and vice versa.  To ensure appropriate public 
services delivery, Law 32/2004 requests central government to gradually enforce the minimum 
standard of services delivery to be adopted by district governments (Brodjonegoro 2003).  
 
3.3.2 Fiscal decentralization 
With most of responsibilities being devolved to the district level, government expenditure has 
been consequently shifting from highly centralized expenditure, dominated by the central budget 
(APBN, Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara) to decentralized expenditure, dominated by the 
district and provincial budget (APBD, Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah).  Before the 2001 
decentralization, the transfers from the central government to the provincial and the district 
governments were made largely through earmarked grants whose largest components were the 
subsidies for autonomous regions (SDO, Subsidi Daerah Otonom) and the President Instruction 
(INPRES, Instruksi Presiden).  The SDO was intended to finance the salaries of civil servants in 
the regions and the regions’ other current expenditure.  The INPRES covered development 
spending in the regions.  It was initially a block grant for development spending in the 1980s, 
then included various specific grants
6
 to finance various programs/projects, from primary school 
rehabilitation to environmental impact assessment (World Bank 2003). 
The 2001 decentralization collapses the SDO and the INPRES into a general allocation 
fund (DAU, Dana Alokasi Umum).  DAU, specific allocation fund (DAK, Dana Alokasi 
Khusus), and revenue sharing (based on natural resources and tax revenue) are the components 
of the new intergovernmental transfer, also called Balancing or Equalization Fund (Dana 
                                                             
6
 See Silver et al. (2001), table 2 on page 353, for a complete list.  
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Perimbangan), which has been dominating sources of revenue for districts.  On average, district 
governments’ own revenues (PAD, Pendapatan Asli Daerah) account for less than 10% of 
districts’ total revenue.  Hence, Indonesia’s 2001 decentralization is widely regarded as one 
characterized by decentralization of expenditure, as opposed to decentralization of revenue, for 
the following reasons: 1) the bulk of district governments’ spending is mostly financed by the 
balancing fund, especially the dominating DAU and 2) district governments exercise limited 
local taxing power (Brodjonegoro 2003).  However, the 2001 decentralization largely removes 
the earmarking (except for the DAK-financed expenditure), but central-regional transfers remain 
the dominant means of financing (World Bank 2003).  
The arrangement of the equalization fund is indeed necessary and justified, because there 
are significant differences in natural resources endowment across Indonesia’s regions; hence, this 
uneven distribution may affect regions’ abilities in generating revenue abilities and disadvantage 
poorly endowed regions or regions without enough agglomeration effects to boost their regional 
economic development.  In addition to addressing vertical fiscal imbalances, the equalization 
fund, especially the DAU, serves to address an undesirable effect of fiscal decentralization, i.e., 
horizontal imbalances (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003).  Indeed, a good feature of 
Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization is that the DAU allocation adopts a formula-based 
mechanism.
7
  This formula-driven allocation avoids a regressive system of decentralization, 
                                                             
7
 See World Bank (2007, 120-21) for a detail explanation on the formula and some innovations in the 
DAU allocation between the original law (Law 25/199) and the amendment (Law 33/2004).  Basically, 
DAU is the sum of its two major components, i.e. basic allocation (BA) to cover the wage bill of civil 
service and fiscal gap (FG).  FG is defined as expenditure needs (EN) minus fiscal capacity (FC). EN is 
the sum of weighted indices multiplied by average expenditure of districts (provinces) for the DAU 
allocation for districts (provinces).  FC is the sum of own revenue, natural-resource revenue sharing, and 
tax revenue sharing.  
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where there is a greater influence of more politically important and economically stronger 
regions over the distribution of transfers, as identified in Prud’homme (1995) and Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill (2004).  To sum up, figure 3.1 illustrates the intergovernmental transfer system 
discussed above, while table 3.1 details the revenue sharing scheme among government tiers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Region’s sources of revenue 
Source: Adapted from Brodjonegoro (2003) 
The equalization fund Own revenue (PAD) 
General allocation fund (DAU) 
Special allocation fund (DAK) 
Revenue sharing 
Tax revenue sharing 
 Land and building 
tax (PBB) 
 Land/property 
transfer fee 
 Personal income tax 
 
 
Natural resources sharing 
 Oil 
 Gas (LNG) 
 Mining (land rent and 
royalty) 
 Forestry (land rent and 
resource provision) 
 Fishery 
 Geothermal 
  
District level 
 Seven local taxes: 
hotel, restaurant, 
entertainment, 
advertisement, street 
light, quarrying, 
parking 
 User chargers/fees: 
building development 
right (IMB), garbage 
collection, piped water 
by local water utility 
(PDAM) 
 
Provincial level 
 Vehicle registration tax 
(PKB) 
 Vehicle ownership 
transfer tax (BBNKB) 
 Fuel tax (PBBKB) 
 Water exploitation tax 
 Allocation:  
o For PKB and 
BBNKB: 30% goes 
to province, 70% 
goes to districts in 
the province; 
district allocation is 
not necessarily 
equal and 
determined in a 
provincial 
regulation 
o For PBBKB: 10% 
goes to province, 
90% goes to 
districts in the 
province; district 
allocation is not 
necessarily equal 
and determined in 
a provincial 
regulation 
 
Sources of revenue for district and province 
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Table 3.1 Revenue sharing scheme (in %) 
Source 
Law 25/1999 Law 33/2004 
Central District Central Province 
Producing Districts within All Indonesia's other districts Collection 
District the same province (equal share) fee 
Tax     
      - Land and building tax 10 90 - 16.2 - 64.8 10 9 
- Land/property transfer fee - - - 16 - 64 20 - 
- Personal income tax 80 20 80 8 - 12 - - 
- Company tax 100 - 100 - - - - - 
         
Natural resources 
        
- Oil 85 15 84.5 3.1 6.2 6.2 - - 
- Gas (LNG) 70 30 69.5 6.1 12.2 12.2 - - 
Natural resources: others 20 80 - - - - - - 
- Mining: land rent - - 20 16 64 - - - 
- Mining: royalty - - 20 16 32 32 - - 
- Forestry: land rent - - 20 16 64 - - - 
- Forestry: resource provision - - 20 16 32 32 - - 
- Fishery - - 20 - - - 80 - 
- Geothermal - - 20 16 32 32 - - 
Source: Adapted from Brodjonegoro (2003).  
Note: ‘-‘ denotes zero or not applicable.  
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3.4 Descriptive and decomposition analysis 
This section estimates regional income inequality and explores its pattern and trend between 
2001 and 2007, using a variety of inequality indices (as described in Chapter 2) based on district-
level per capita regional GDP.  The study period corresponds to an early, yet crucial, period of 
the implementation of decentralization.  This period includes both the original and revised 
decentralization frameworks (that set out by the 1999 and the 2004 Laws) and captures high 
enthusiasm combined with high expectation for the desirable effects of decentralization among 
stakeholders.  
The analysis has two purposes.  First, it investigates whether there is any evidence of 
narrowing interregional inequality during the study period.  Secondly, it further examines what 
has contributed to changes in the overall inequality across Indonesian districts.  Are the changes 
in overall inequality driven more by changes in equality within provinces (or other subgroups) or 
by changes in equality between provinces (or other subgroups)?  To answer this question, the 
analysis proceeds to decompose changes in overall inequality into changes within different 
groups and changes between those groups.  
 
3.4.1 Data  
The analysis employs per capita regional GDP from McCulloch’s (2011) unique dataset8 based 
on regional GDP and population data produced and provided by the Indonesia’s Central 
Statistical Agency (BPS, Badan Pusat Statistik).  For a robustness check, this paper uses both per 
capita regional GDP with and without the oil and gas sector.  The reason for conducting this 
                                                             
8
 The dataset was produced as part of a research project funded by Ausaid and led by Dr. Neil McCulloch 
at the Institute of Development Studies, UK.  It is recently made available for researchers to use the 
dataset for their own researches.  It compiles data on socio-economic characteristics across Indonesian 
districts from 2001 to 2007.  
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check is that while per capita regional GDP is a common proxy for regional income and widely 
used in the previous studies of regional income disparities in Indonesia and elsewhere, per capita 
regional GDP excluding oil and gas is less noisy as a proxy for regional income.  The presence 
of natural resources-based activities, in particular oil and gas sectors that has been dominating 
Indonesian extractive activities or mining output, inflates measured local economic activity, 
although these sectors have much less effect on local/host economies and their economic and 
social welfare.
9
  Much of the returns to extractive activities, even after taking into account a new 
revenue sharing scheme, accrue to external entities (mostly central government and privately-
owned oil and gas companies).  Also, because oil and gas sectors are more highly capital 
intensive (as compared to forestry and small-scale gold mining), they have smaller local 
employment and income multipliers (Hill et al. 2009).  Therefore, regional GDP net of oil and 
gas sectors is considered a better indicator for local economic activity and welfare.  
The use of district-level data rather than provincial data has two advantages.  First, it 
makes possible a decomposition analysis.  Many previous studies on regional income disparities 
in Indonesia use provincial data (e.g., Akita and Lukman 1995; García García and 
Soelistianingsih 1998), so they are unable to analyze within province inequality.  Secondly, it 
provides a large sample size, i.e., 342 districts, rather than only 30 provinces.  The full sample of 
342 districts used in this study consists of 73 kotas (cities) and 269 kabupatens (regencies).
10
  
                                                             
9
 Booth (2003) shows that the regions with high per capita GDP are not necessarily the ones with high 
living standards or low incidence of poverty.  A popular example has been Papua (formerly called Irian 
Jaya).  
 
10
 An organizational impact of decentralization is the splitting of district and province.  So, the number of 
districts and provinces in Indonesia has changed.  Excluding six non-autonomous district level 
governments in Jakarta, the number has grown from 336 districts and 30 provinces in 2001 to 477 
districts and 33 provinces in 2009.  To ensure a consistent comparison across the years, the dataset uses 
2001 as a reference point and follows the definition used by the Ministry of Finance, i.e., an autonomous 
district/province is the one that receives DAU in the beginning of fiscal year.  So, the full sample of 342 
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Tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix B provide the detailed distribution of the districts across 
Indonesian five regions and 30 provinces.  
 
3.4.2 Methods 
This paper estimates overall inequality across districts by calculating the Gini coefficient of 
inequality, Atkinson’s inequality measures, and generalized entropy (  ) measures based on 
district-level per capita regional GDP with and without oil and gas sectors.  To see whether there 
is a change in the level of inequality, the indices are calculated for 2001 and 2007, the beginning 
and the end of study period.  The indices satisfy desirable characteristics in measures of 
inequality: mean independence, population-size independence, and Pigou-Dalton transfer 
sensitivity.
11
  In addition, Atkinson’s and    measures are decomposable, but only the latter is 
additively decomposable (Houghton and Khandker 2009).  Therefore, the decomposition 
analysis in this current paper uses    with a parameter value α that is set to be 0, also known as 
mean log deviation or Theil’s L (henceforth, referred simply as the Theil index,  ).  
 The Gini coefficient takes a value between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (complete 
inequality).  It is expressed as follows:         ∑ (        (        
 
   , where xi is a 
point on the horizontal axis (that depicts the cumulative percentage of districts, from the poorest 
to richest ones) and yi is a point on the vertical axis (that represents cumulative percentage of a 
given variable, i.e., per capita regional GDP).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
districts and 30 provinces used in this study consists of 336 autonomous district and six non-autonomous 
district-level governments in Jakarta.  
 
11 Mean independence satisfies a condition where if all values were doubled, the measure of inequality 
would not change; under the criterion of population-size independence, the inequality measure should not 
change, if population were to change, all else equal; under the Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity criterion, 
the transfer from the rich to the poor would reduce the inequality level (Houghton and Khandker 2009).  
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The Atkinson class is formulated as follows:  
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with the common values of ε are 0.5, 1, and 2; while the general form the generalized entropy 
(GE) inequality measures is 
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where  ̅ is the mean of per capita regional GDP.  The GE measure takes on values between 0 
(perfect equal distribution) and infinity (higher values representing higher levels of inequality).  
The parameter α can be any real value.  The   (   or mean log deviation ( ) has the following 
expression:  
  (   
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)                                                    (4) 
For the rest of the paper, the Theil index,   denotes   (  .  
This paper applies the same decomposition method as used by Mookherjee and Shorrocks 
(1982) and Jenkins (1995), taking advantage of the mean log deviation ( )’s characteristic of 
additive decomposability.  Thus,   can be decomposed into between and within components 
(first term and second term, respectively):  
  ∑       ∑     (   ⁄                  (5) 
where subscript k indicates subgroup k.  Thus,    is Theil index for subgroup k;    refers to a 
subgroup’s population share and defined as       ⁄ , where    and   are the population size 
of subgroup k and the whole population, respectively;    is the relative mean of subgroup k 
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defined as       ⁄ , where    and   are the mean income of subgroup k and for the whole 
population, respectively.  
 Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) also show that the changes in Theil index,   , can be 
decomposed as:  
   ∑  ̅      ∑  ̅      ∑ ( ̅      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )     ∑ ( ̅   ̅                  (6) 
where a bar over a variable denotes an average of the values in two points of time and   
represent the change in the variables between the time of reference;    is a subgroup’s income 
share.  The first term reflects the impact of changes in inequality within subgroups.  The second 
and third terms capture the effect of changes in the population shares on the ‘within group’ and 
the ‘between group’ components, respectively.  The fourth term represents the contribution to    
attributable to relative changes in the subgroup means.  Equation (6) implies that the 
contributions to the overall change in inequality can come from three sources: 1) the ‘pure’ 
changes in within subgroup inequality); 2) population effects; and 3) relative income effects.  In 
this paper, because the number of districts in the provinces is maintained to be the same in the 
study period, zero or almost zero population effects are expected.   
 Unlike the method used by Akita and Alisjahbana (2002) that imposes a rigid hierarchical 
structure (region-province-district) to decompose overall inequality into between-region, within-
province, and between-province inequality, the advantage of Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982)’s 
method is that it allows flexible and unrestrictive ways of subgrouping.  This paper applies 
various ways in subgrouping the whole districts: by provinces, by regions, by Jawa vs. off Jawa, 
and by the district’s administration types (i.e., regency or kabupaten vs. city or kota ).  What is 
more, Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982)’s method is able to quantify the contributions of 
different sources to the observed changes in inequality.    
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3.4.3 Results 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 compare inequality across districts between 2001 and 2007, based on per 
capita GDP with and without oil and gas, respectively.  Both figures present various inequality 
indices and tell the same story.  The level of inequality in 2007 was lower than the one in 2001, 
regardless of the choice of index.  The study period that corresponds to the early implementation 
of decentralization witnessed a narrowing inequality.  Across indices, the changes (i.e., the 
reduction of disparity levels) appear to be higher for per capita GDP including oil and gas 
sectors, suggesting the equalizing role of resources-based revenue sharing tends to be more 
apparent in the use of per capita GDP with oil and gas sectors.  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Figure 3.2 Inequality across districts, 2001 vs. 2007 (per capita GDP)  
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Figure 3.3 Inequality across districts, 2001 vs. 2007 (per capita GDP without  
oil and gas)  
 
While overall inequality decreased in 2007 (as indicated by both figures 3.2 and 3.3, also 
see table B.3 in the appendix B), the subnational pattern reveals some heterogeneity.  Not every 
province, region, or category of other regional grouping experienced a reduction of disparity 
across its districts.  Instead, some provinces experienced higher levels of inequality across their 
districts in 2007 (see table 3.2 and figure 3.4).  Using per capita GDP and the Theil index, the 
provinces with higher inter-district inequality in 2007 included Sumatera Utara, Jambi, 
Bengkulu, Lampung, Banten, Kalimantan Selatan, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Sulawesi Tengah, and 
Sulawesi Tenggara.  Using the same index, but excluding oil and gas from per capita GDP, the 
number of provinces experiencing widening inequality across their districts in 2007 increased; 
now, it also included some oil and gas-rich provinces, e.g., Kalimantan Timur and Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam.  By regional grouping (as opposed to provincial grouping), Kalimantan 
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emerged as a region with higher inter-district inequality in 2007 based on per capita GDP 
without oil and gas; when oil and gas are excluded from per capita GDP, the Jawa-Bali region 
experienced the higher inter-district inequality in 2007 (see table 3.3).  
 
 
    Source: Author’s creation. 
     
    Figure 3.4 The change in within province inequality across districts, 2001-2007 
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From these findings, two outcomes can be highlighted.  First, inter-district inequality 
dynamics indicate no straightforward pattern at subnational levels/aggregations.  Secondly, the 
pattern also depends on the variable on which the Theil index is based.  Including oil and gas 
into per capita GDP yields a smaller number of provinces with higher inter-district inequality and 
the identified provinces were not those considered as oil-rich provinces. It is possible that the 
equalizing role of resources-based revenue sharing might be more effectively captured if 
inequality dynamics are examined through an inequality measure based on per capita GDP with 
oil and gas sectors.  
 To make a better sense on the pattern at the subnational levels, this paper decomposes the 
whole population (i.e., all Indonesian districts) into various subgroups: by province, by region, 
by Jawa districts vs. off Jawa districts, and by kabupaten vs. kota.  The decomposition analysis 
considers that total inequality is the sum of the inequalities within each group and the inequality 
that exists between the groups.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the coefficient of inequality using the 
Theil index and its decomposition by province and by other subgroupings, respectively.  Across 
the years and the indicators (i.e., per capita GDP with and without oil and gas), the contributions 
of within group inequality to the total inequality were always much higher than the contributions 
of between group inequality in non-provincial subgrouping (see table 3.3).  In addition, broader 
aggregation (e.g., comparing Jawa districts vs. off-Jawa with five regions subgrouping) yields 
higher discrepancy in the contributions.  
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Table 3.2 Coefficient of inequality (Theil index) by province and its decomposition 
Province 
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP no oil 
2001 2007 Change 2001 2007 Change 
Overall Indonesia 0.486 0.385 -0.101 0.319 0.285 -0.034 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 0.269 0.121 -0.148 0.030 0.049 0.019 
Sumatera Utara 0.055 0.058 0.003 0.055 0.058 0.003 
Sumatera Barat 0.039 0.030 -0.009 0.039 0.030 -0.009 
Riau 0.312 0.192 -0.120 0.158 0.117 -0.040 
Jambi 0.061 0.069 0.008 0.030 0.038 0.008 
Sumatera Selatan 0.097 0.078 -0.019 0.035 0.041 0.006 
Bengkulu 0.057 0.081 0.024 0.057 0.081 0.024 
Lampung 0.021 0.024 0.004 0.022 0.026 0.004 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.002 
DKI Jakarta 0.136 0.122 -0.014 0.136 0.276 0.140 
Jawa Barat 0.171 0.159 -0.012 0.173 0.164 -0.009 
Banten 0.361 0.401 0.039 0.361 0.401 0.039 
Jawa Tengah 0.156 0.155 -0.001 0.143 0.134 -0.008 
DI Yogyakarta 0.085 0.076 -0.009 0.085 0.076 -0.009 
Jawa Timur 0.406 0.371 -0.035 0.408 0.376 -0.032 
Bali 0.058 0.052 -0.005 0.058 0.052 -0.005 
Kalimantan Barat 0.091 0.082 -0.009 0.091 0.082 -0.009 
Kalimantan Tengah 0.044 0.017 -0.027 0.044 0.017 -0.027 
Kalimantan Selatan 0.079 0.082 0.003 0.065 0.069 0.004 
Kalimantan Timur 0.690 0.507 -0.183 0.132 0.218 0.086 
Sulawesi Utara 0.077 0.070 -0.007 0.077 0.070 -0.007 
Sulawesi Tengah 0.020 0.033 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.006 
Sulawesi Selatan 0.129 0.084 -0.045 0.129 0.083 -0.045 
Sulawesi Tenggara 0.055 0.080 0.026 0.055 0.080 0.026 
Gorontalo 0.025 0.017 -0.008 0.025 0.017 -0.008 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.201 0.166 -0.035 0.201 0.166 -0.035 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 0.069 0.082 0.013 0.069 0.082 0.013 
Maluku 0.112 0.101 -0.011 0.114 0.103 -0.011 
Maluku Utara 0.019 0.014 -0.005 0.019 0.014 -0.005 
Papua 1.003 0.537 -0.466 1.032 0.552 -0.480 
     Decomposition 
      
 "Within" province inequality (WI) 0.208 0.163 -0.045 0.170 0.147 -0.023 
"Between" province inequality (BE) 0.278 0.222 -0.056 0.149 0.139 -0.011 
WI as percentage of overall inequality 43% 42% 
 
53% 51% 
 BI as percentage of overall inequality 57% 58%   47% 49%   
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Table 3.3 Coefficient of inequality (Theil index) by regional/administrative grouping and its 
decomposition 
Grouping (Area/Administrative) 
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP no oil 
2001 2007 Change 2001 2007 Change 
Overall Indonesia 0.486 0.385 -0.101 0.319 0.285 -0.034 
Sumatera 0.292 0.181 -0.111 0.107 0.092 -0.014 
Jawa-Bali 0.387 0.415 0.028 0.389 0.389 0.000 
Kalimantan 0.726 0.543 -0.183 0.193 0.239 0.047 
Sulawesi 0.112 0.092 -0.020 0.112 0.090 -0.022 
Eastern Indonesia 0.782 0.459 -0.323 0.776 0.450 -0.327 
     Decomposition 
      
 "Within" region inequality (WI) 0.411 0.326 -0.085 0.300 0.257 -0.043 
"Between" region inequality (BE) 0.074 0.059 -0.016 0.019 0.028 0.009 
WI as percentage of overall inequality 85% 85% 
 
94% 90% 
 
BI as percentage of overall inequality 15% 15% 
 
6% 10% 
 
 
      
Off-Jawa 0.514 0.358 -0.156 0.271 0.217 -0.054 
Jawa 0.412 0.441 0.029 0.415 0.415 -0.001 
     Decomposition 
      
 "Within" region inequality (WI) 0.481 0.385 -0.096 0.318 0.281 -0.037 
"Between" region inequality (BE) 0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003 
WI as percentage of overall inequality 99% 100% 
 
100% 99% 
 
BI as percentage of overall inequality 1% 0% 
 
0% 1% 
 
 
      
Kabupaten 0.373 0.287 -0.085 0.256 0.204 -0.052 
Kota 0.568 0.444 -0.124 0.315 0.310 -0.005 
     Decomposition 
      
 "Within" group inequality (WI) 0.415 0.321 -0.094 0.268 0.226 -0.042 
"Between" group inequality (BE) 0.071 0.064 -0.007 0.051 0.059 0.008 
WI as percentage of overall inequality 85% 83% 
 
84% 79% 
 
BI as percentage of overall inequality 15% 17% 
 
16% 21% 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
However, decomposition by province (see table 3.2) shows a different pattern.  For both 
years, the contributions of within province inequality were slightly lower than the ones of 
between province inequality for per capita GDP with oil and gas.  The situation was reversed 
when per capita GDP without oil and gas is used.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that the 
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role of within province and between province inequalities to total inequality was almost equally 
important for both years and indicators.  
Table 3.4 provides a detailed decomposition of inequality changes into components as 
expressed by terms in equation (6).  The table decomposes total changes into four different 
effects: one within group inequality effect and three between group effects.  Overall, the 
dominant effects responsible for the observed changes were changes in inequality within group 
and changes in relative income.  The contribution to    attributable to changes in within 
province inequality and the impact of changes in the province mean income were not so much 
different and reinforced each other.  In other words, both effects were about the same order of 
magnitude and generated the same impact towards total inequality change.  
 
 
Table 3.4 Decomposition of the trend in aggregate inequality (2001 vs. 2007, Theil index) 
 
A) Per capita GDP 
 
Contribution to ∆T due to changes in 
Grouping by 
  
Population Population 
 
Overall change Within-group share share Mean group 
∆T inequality (within) (between) income 
-0.101 -0.045 0.000 0.006 -0.062 Province 
-0.101 -0.085 0.000 0.000 -0.015 Region 
-0.101 -0.096 0.000 0.000 -0.004 Jawa vs. off-Jawa 
-0.101 -0.094 0.000 0.000 -0.007 Kota vs. Kabupaten 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
B) Per capita GDP no oil 
 
Contribution to ∆T due to changes in   
  
Population Population 
 
 Overall change Within-group share share Mean group 
 ∆T inequality (within) (between) income Grouping by 
-0.034 -0.023 0.000 0.008 -0.019 Province 
-0.034 -0.043 0.000 0.000 0.009 Region 
-0.034 -0.037 0.000 0.000 0.003 Jawa vs. off-Jawa 
-0.034 -0.042 0.000 0.000 0.008 Kota vs. Kabupaten 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Having presented the results, the rest of this section reviews and highlights the main 
findings.  The descriptive and decomposition analysis show that the decentralizing processes in 
Indonesia over the period 2001-2007 generated a reduction of regional income disparities, 
measured by district-level per capita GDP with and without oil and gas.  Inequality levels 
observed in the beginning and the end of period were almost equally due to within province and 
between province inequalities.  Consequently, the observed reduction of inequality during the 
period was attributable to the reduction of within province inequality and the reduction of 
relative provincial means.  Other regional groupings show a much larger role of within group 
inequality.  Therefore, by non-provincial groupings, the reduction of within group inequality 
played a greater effect to the reduction of overall inequality.  
From table 3.3, including oil and gas in per capita GDP, we can identify the top five 
provinces that experienced the largest reduction of within province inequality across their 
districts.  These provinces are Papua, Kalimantan Timur, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Riau, and 
Sulawesi Selatan.  All these provinces have one thing on common: they are heavily characterized 
by resources-based enclave economy, where resources-related industries are concentrated in few 
districts or even in a single district.  Both Kalimantan Timur and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’s 
wealth are from oil and gas (and also timber for Kalimantan Timur).  Both Papua and West Nusa 
Tenggara are dominated by non-oil and gas mining, such as gold and copper.  Riau’s enclave 
activities are more diverse and include oil, export-oriented cash crops, and an export-oriented 
manufacturing center in Batam that has strong socio-economic links with Singapore.   
With oil and gas excluded, the list of top provinces with the largest reduction of within 
province disparity changes.  Papua, Riau, and Nusa Tenggara Barat remain in the list, and 
Sulawesi Selatan (that has traditionally been a major agricultural exporter) joins the list, ranked 
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second after Papua.  As described before, all these four provinces’ enclave sectors are non-oil 
and gas, though they are still resources-related activities.  Interestingly, Kalimantan Timur and 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam now join the list of top 10 provinces with the largest increase in 
within province inequality (Kalimantan Timur and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam are ranked 
second and sixth, respectively).  It appears that the 2001 decentralization has significantly 
enriched Kutai Kartanegara regency of Kalimantan Timur and Lhokseumawe city of Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam (both are oil districts in their respective province) and it has increased the 
provinces’ within inequality.  
While this initial analysis suggests that the early period of decentralization has 
experienced a decrease in overall inequality across Indonesian districts, the impact may vary at 
subnational level and the observed patterns may be different depending on the aggregation or the 
indicator used.  Thus, a further investigation on the relationship between decentralization and 
interregional inequality needs to take into account regional characteristics and other variables 
that may also be associated with inequality. Such investigation is carried out in the next section.  
 
3.5 Model specification 
Following the discussion on the theoretical link between decentralization and regional income 
disparities, the specified model adopts the Tselios et al. (2012) multiplicative interaction model 
that links regional inequality to fiscal decentralization, controlling for variables thought to 
moderate the relationship between inequality and decentralization, such as level of development 
and the interaction between the degree of fiscal decentralization and the level of development.  
The basic estimating equation for inequality across districts is defined as follows:   
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                                                  (7)  
 
where subscript i and t refer to district i and year t, respectively, and  ,   ,…,     are parameters 
to be estimated.  The model specification is based on panel data analysis, where    represents the 
district fixed effects (i.e., the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of district i),    captures 
the time fixed effects, and      is the error term.  The panel approach allows us to minimize 
potential problems of omitted variable bias as well as to increase the accuracy of parameter 
estimates and the degrees of freedom (Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002).  
Adopting the approach of Bonet (2006), the dependent variable       is a district-level 
inequality measure for district i and year t, defined as:  
 
 
     |
        
        
  | 
(8)  
    
where          is the district-level per capita GDP at year t, while          is the national per 
capita GDP at year t, defined as          
∑        
∑        
 , where        and        are the district-
level GDP and population, respectively at year t.  There are three reasons to adopt this inequality 
measure.  First, this research intends to fit the specified panel data model at the district level, not 
at any other higher regional level (such as provincial level), because the Indonesian 2001 
decentralization applies at the district-level government.  The inequality measure as defined in 
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equation (7) allows us to apply a panel estimation approach in which i corresponds to the 
districts sample (i=1, 2, …, 300)12 and t corresponds to the study period (t=2001, 2002, …, 
2007).  Secondly, calculating alternative measures of cross-sectional inequality (e.g., coefficient 
of variation, Gini, or Theil) at the district level requires sub-district level information (i.e., 
household or person-level information) that is not available.  Thirdly, quantifying inequality 
using other measures of cross-sectional inequality at provincial level (i.e., within-province 
inequality) will greatly reduce the observations, will limit the available degrees of freedom for 
the estimations, and will not allow the fitting of the district-level model.  For example, 
computing the Gini will take all the cross-sectional district-level observations for each particular 
year, thus the analysis must have been completed at a level higher than district level (e.g., 
provincial level), which is undesirable given the first reason.  
The inequality measure in equation (7) reflects how advanced a given district is in terms 
of per capita GDP relative to other regions, because it is based on the concept of the relative per 
capita GDP.  For a given year and under a perfect equality condition, the district-level per capita 
GDP should be equal to the national per capita GDP.  Thus, the inequality is measured as the 
distance from the relative share to the perfect equal share.  Larger distance in absolute terms 
indicates higher inequality.   
      is the key independent variable and a measure for the degree of fiscal 
decentralization for district i at year t.  The approach uses three different groups of indicators for 
the decentralization measure: 1) aggregating the equalization funds received by district i at year t 
into a single proxy, i.e., the share of total equalization revenue to total revenue (       ); 2) 
disaggregating the equalization fund received by district i at year t into two indicators, i.e., the 
                                                             
12
 A full sample of autonomous districts (i.e. the districts that receive the equalization fund) will have 336 
districts.  For the econometric analysis, the 36 districts are dropped from the sample due to incomplete 
information.  
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share of general allocation fund to total revenue (           and the share of total revenue 
sharing to total revenue (        ); and 3) disaggregating the equalization fund received by 
district i at year t into three indicators, i.e., the share of general allocation fund to total revenue 
(          , the share of tax-based revenue sharing to total revenue (       ), and the share of 
resources-based revenue sharing to total revenue (         ).  
The specified decentralization indicators capture the role of equalization fund, which is 
the primary ingredient of the Indonesian decentralization, in reducing or increasing between-
districts inequality (see figure 3.1).  By disaggregating the equalization fund into its components, 
we can estimate not only the overall impact of the equalization fund (       ), but also the impact 
of the general allocation fund (         ) and the revenue sharing (        ).  Similarly, 
disaggregating the revenue sharing even further into its two components allows us to investigate 
whether the tax-based revenue sharing (       ) and the resources-based revenue sharing 
(         ) have different impacts.  The decentralization indicators exclude special allocation 
fund for three reasons: 1) not all districts, in fact only a few districts, receive the special 
allocation fund for a given year; 2) its share in the district’s total revenue is very small, while the 
share of general allocation fund and the share of revenue sharing are dominant, on average 
during the study period, accounted for 67% and 14% of the district’ total revenue, respectively; 
and 3) the special allocation fund-financed expenditure is earmarked expenditure, while the 
revenue sharing and the general allocation fund provides the district governments with the 
greatest degree of discretion in spending.  
The estimated parameter values for the decentralization variables are expected to be 
negative, reflecting the hypothesis that the current decentralization arrangement reduces 
inequality.  The decentralization indicators were calculated based on the data compiled from the 
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Indonesian government finance statistics, provided by Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance, the 
Directorate General of Finance Equalization (DJPK, Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan 
Keuangan).  
Whether the inequality-decentralization relationship is contingent on the district’s level of 
development is addressed by including per capita non-oil and gas manufacturing GDP 
(          of a district and its squared value, taken as a proxy for the level of development of a 
district, and the interaction variables between the fiscal decentralization indicators and per capita 
manufacturing GDP.  The specification for controlling for the level of development in explaining 
inequality is similar to the one used by Kuznets (1955) and Williamson (1965).  However, given 
the construction of the dependent variable and to reduce the potential endogeneity bias, the 
analysis uses per capita manufacturing GDP, instead of per capita GDP as used in Kuznets 
(1955) and Williamson (1965).  If the Kuznets/Williamson inverted U-shape for the inequality-
level of development relationship holds for this current research, the estimated parameter values 
for         and     
 
   
 are expected to be positive and negative, respectively.  
As noted in section 3.3, the 2001 decentralization in Indonesia does not only provide 
additional fiscal resources, but also considerable discretionary power to the district governments 
in formulating policies and allocating resources.  Therefore, some proxies are included for this 
authority, namely: the spending behavior, defined as per capita development spending 
(         ; the size of public sector, measured as the share of total expenditure to GDP 
(          ; the road quality in a district, defined as the share of villages in the district where 
the main roads are asphaltic paved (        ; and the communication/information access in a 
district, measured as telephone access per household (         , calculated by dividing the 
number of landline phone connected-households to the total households in the district.  These 
95 
 
proxies can be considered as the indirect key independent variables.  In other words, these 
proxies are used to indirectly capture how the decentralized district governments behave and/or 
the outcome of their behavior.  The estimation results will provide insights into how their 
behavior or the outcome of their behavior affects the inequality across districts.  It is expected 
that the estimated parameter values for the level of development spending, the road quality, and 
the information access will be negative.  However, the impact of the size of public sector can be 
either positive or negative, depending on whether the expansion of public sector (which is 
expected in the decentralized government) promotes competition thus efficiency or is of waste 
due to sacrificing scale economies (Zax 1989).  
The model also includes other control variables to capture some essential sources of 
heterogeneity among districts and the main structural and economic features of Indonesian 
districts.  The control variables include the share of people who completed or who are in high 
secondary school (         and the role of manufacturing sector in a district’s economy 
(         , measured as the share of non-oil and gas manufacturing GDP to total GDP.  In 
addition, to capture whether the district economy is dominated by a particular sector, the 
economic specialization/diversity of a district is also controlled for, measured as the sectoral Gini 
(           .  Finally, the proportion of population living in a district’s urban areas  (          is 
also included.  The last two control variables, providing a sense of spatial concentration of 
economic and human activities in a district, are proxies for agglomeration forces that are widely 
considered as the underlying determinants of the observed spatial inequality (Combes et al. 
2011; Kim 2008).  
Table 3.5 lists the variables and their descriptions, roles, and expected signs in the 
estimation.  Data to calculate the fiscal decentralization variables are from the DJPK’s 
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government finance statistics, while data to generate other variables are from the BPS’ various 
database compiled by McCulloch (2011).  
Following Brambor et al. (2006), the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on 
inequality, defined as       ⁄            , monitors changes along the observed range of 
per capita manufacturing GDP.  This approach takes into account the continuous nature of the 
level of development as the moderator for the inequality-decentralization relationship.  
To address a potential endogeneity problem, Greenstone’s (2002) strategy is adopted by 
fitting the model where all independent variables are time lagged.  In this current paper, the 
independent variables and time fixed effects are set at     as expressed in equation (9).  The 
time-lagged strategy effectively solves the endogeneity problem without difficulty in finding 
valid instruments for the variables thought to be endogenous.  
 
                                     
 
     
                     
                                                    
                                                        
              (9)  
 
The time-lagged approach is also intuitively suitable for the study case.  It is well known that the 
government budget cycle at the district and other government levels or units in Indonesia is in 
practice heavily characterized by delayed budget approval and disbursement.  In many cases, the 
budget will not be disbursed until the fourth quarter of the current fiscal year (i.e., around 
October of the calendar year).  Such practice has long been the practice and continues even under 
the decentralization era.  In addition, we also expect some time lags for the impact of the 
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development level, government spending, public sector, economic activities such as 
manufacturing, some infrastructure, human capital, and agglomeration effects on the district’s 
production structure that will eventually affect the observed inequality across districts.  
 
 Table 3.5 Variable description
Variable Description Expected sign 
Dependent  
      I A district-level inequality measure  
 Independent, key, direct proxy for 
decentralization (FD) 
  
     reve The share of total equalization fund to  total revenue - 
     revgaf The share of general allocation fund to  total revenue - 
     shrev The share of total revenue sharing to  total revenue  - 
     revx The share of tax-based revenue sharing to  total 
revenue 
- 
     revres The share of resources-based revenue sharing to 
total revenue  
- 
Independent, moderator, proxy for 
level of development 
  
     manpc Per capita non-oil and gas manufacturing GDP  + (but - for its 
squared term) 
Independent, indirect proxy for  
decentralization  
 
     devpc Per capita development spending  +/- 
     expgdp The share of total expenditure to GDP  +/- 
     road The share of villages in the district where the main 
roads are asphaltic paved  
- 
     phone Telephone access per household  - 
Independent, other control variables   
     sech The share of people ever/being in high secondary 
school  
- 
     shman The share of non-oil and gas manufacturing GDP to 
total GDP 
- 
     ginisec The sectoral Gini  +/- 
     shurb The proportion of population living in a district’s 
urban areas  
+/- 
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3.6 Estimation results 
The descriptive statistics for the variables are reported in table 3.6.  The mean, standard 
deviation, and minimum and maximum value for both non-lagged variables and their 
corresponding lagged variables are similar.  The wide range between the minimum and 
maximum value of all variables suggests a large heterogeneity across Indonesian districts in the 
sample.  
Table 3.6 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
I 2,100 0.69729 1.95742 0.00021 39.64193 
reve 2,100 0.84799 0.08402 0.26250 0.99226 
reve (t-1)  1,800 0.84652 0.08525 0.26250 0.99226 
revgaf 2,100 0.66842 0.16725 0.00121 0.98169 
revgaf (t-1)  1,800 0.67353 0.16642 0.05482 0.98169 
shrev 2,100 0.14335 0.15121 0.00615 0.92233 
shrev (t-1) 1,800 0.14317 0.14644 0.00615 0.86561 
revx 2,100 0.09006 0.07884 0.00125 0.85937 
revx (t-1) 1,800 0.08734 0.07166 0.00125 0.85937 
revres 2,100 0.06351 0.13670 3.86E-06 0.76812 
revres (t-1) 1,800 0.06338 0.13436 3.86E-06 0.76766 
manpc 2,100 1,183,539 3,762,542 2,976.49 5.57E+07 
manpc (t-1) 1,800 1,175,033 3,754,433 2,976.49 5.57E+07 
devpc 2,100 459,745 777,645 608.59 1.18E+07 
devpc (t-1) 1,800 390,129 612,657 609 8,736,138 
expgdp  2,100 0.20389 0.17178 0.00727 0.99720 
expgdp (t-1) 1,800 0.18340 0.15208 0.00727 0.98543 
road 2,100 0.62486 0.26756 0.01389 1 
road (t-1) 1,800 0.61865 0.26736 0.01389 1 
phone  2,100 0.09491 0.11302 0.00006 0.67094 
phone (t-1) 1,800 0.09322 0.11116 0.00006 0.67094 
sech 2,100 0.16380 0.07712 0.00000 0.48852 
sech (t-1) 1,800 0.16233 0.07813 0.00000 0.48852 
shman 2,100 0.13510 0.14152 0.00034 0.82674 
shman (t-1) 1,800 0.13562 0.14217 0.00034 0.82674 
ginisec 2,100 0.55272 0.10235 0.28364 0.85467 
ginisec (t-1) 1,800 0.55429 0.10264 0.28399 0.85467 
shurb 2,100 0.38299 0.31831 0 1 
shurb (t-1) 1,800 0.38277 0.31870 0 1 
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The descriptive statistics truly reflect the reality of the Indonesia’s geography of 
development, that is a high spatial diversity in resource endowments, economic structure, and 
population settlements.  During the study period, the range of the share of people who ever 
attended/graduated from high school to the total population was zero in Kabupaten Puncak Jaya 
in Papua province to almost one half in Kota Batam in Riau province, which is an export-
oriented manufacturing center that has strong socio-economic links with Singapore.  Kabupaten 
Puncak Jaya had a zero share of urban population, while the population in the large districts in 
Jawa provinces and the primary districts in some off-Jawa provinces were totally urban.   
The fixed-effects estimations exploit the panel structure of the dataset for the 300 districts 
over the period 2001-2007 and their results are presented in table 3.7.  Models 1-3 are the 
baseline models, based on equation (7), where fiscal decentralization is proxied by the overall 
equalization fund (reve) for model 1, by the general allocation fund (revgaf) and overall revenue 
sharing (shrev) for model 2, and by the general allocation fund, tax-based revenue sharing (revx), 
and resource-based revenue sharing (revres) for model 3.  Models 4-6 are the corresponding 
homoscedastic results for models 1-3, where the standard errors are clustered at the district level.  
Models 7-9 are run to address a potential endogeneity problem, based on equation (9), where all 
predictors are lagged.  Models 10-12 are the corresponding models for models 7-9, but with the 
clustered-robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity.  The control variables are the 
same in all models.  The interaction terms are the product of the applicable fiscal decentralization 
proxy and the level of development (manpc).  Overall, the time dummies are significant, so that 
the inclusion of time fixed-effects is justified, but the estimates of the time dummies are not 
included in table 3.7.  
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Table 3.7 The fixed-effects estimation results 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
fe1 fe2 fe3 fe1_rob fe2_rob fe3_rob 
Overall equalization fund, reve -.01697   -.01697   
 (.1819)*   (.3319)   
General allocation fund, revgaf  -.0395 -.03513  -.0395 -.03513 
  (.1659)** (.1546)**  (.2179)* (.2204)+ 
Overall revenue sharing, shrev  -.1244   -.1244  
  (.1955)***   (.6091)**  
Tax-based revenue sharing, revx   .001533   .001533 
   (.1478)   (.59) 
Resource-based revenue sharing, revres   -.1369   -.1369 
   (.2429)***   (.8549)* 
Development level, manpc 2.647 2.829 2.908 2.647 2.829 2.908 
 (6.45e-08)*** (6.48e-08)*** (6.08e-08)*** (8.33e-07)+ (9.15e-07) (8.17e-07)+ 
Development level (sq. term), manpc2 -1.803 -1.865 -2.08 -1.803 -1.865 -2.08 
 (1.19e-15)*** (1.20e-15)*** (1.18e-15)*** (1.39e-14) (1.40e-14) (1.42e-14)+ 
Equalization fund X Development    .1649   .1649   
level, reve X manpc (3.21e-08)***   (8.13e-08)   
General allocation fund X Development    .1377 .117  .1377 .117 
level, revgaf X manpc  (3.54e-08)*** (3.41e-08)***  (8.99e-08) (7.48e-08) 
Revenue sharing X Development   -.04301   -.04301  
level, shrev X manpc  (4.04e-08)*   (1.80e-07)  
Tax-based revenue sharing X Development    -.1938   -.1938 
level, revx X manpc   (4.77e-08)***   (5.97e-07) 
Resource-based revenue sharing X Development    .0001177   .0001177 
level, revres X manpc     (5.82e-08)     (1.72e-07) 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
fe1 fe2 fe3 fe1_rob fe2_rob fe3_rob 
Per capita development spending, devpc -.08438 -.0747 -.06949 -.08438 -.0747 -.06949 
 (2.34e-08)*** (2.28e-08)*** (2.21e-08)*** (9.83e-08)* (9.12e-08)* (7.29e-08)* 
Public sector size, expgdp .1234 .1268 .1176 .1234 .1268 .1176 
 (.1511)*** (.1479)*** (.1409)*** (.7694)+ (.7856)+ (.6135)* 
Road quality, road -.02597 -.01703 -.02268 -.02597 -.01703 -.02268 
 (.1502) (.1462) (.1388) (.2012) (.199) (.2089) 
Telephone access, phone -.04914 -.0574 -.05492 -.04914 -.0574 -.05492 
 (.2947)** (.2865)*** (.2717)*** (.5554) (.6551) (.6253) 
People ever/being in high school, sech .0182 .01334 .0146 .0182 .01334 .0146 
 (.4255) (.4135) (.395) (.4358) (.4301) (.4324) 
Share of manufacturing GDP, shman -.8287 -.8175 -.7937 -.8287 -.8175 -.7937 
 (.8027)*** (.7814)*** (.7445)*** (6.683)+ (6.151)+ (5.245)* 
Sectoral concentration in the economy, ginisec .04801 .02177 .02083 .04801 .02177 .02083 
 (.7221) (.704) (.6708) (2.051) (2.163) (2.074) 
Urban population, shurb -.1113 -.1022 -.104 -.1113 -.1022 -.104 
 (.3267)* (.3177)* (.3027)* (.4956) (.4728) (.4546) 
N 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
F stat 41.74 45.17 54.35 . . . 
Likelihood stat -517.5 -455.8 -346.8 -517.5 -455.8 -346.8 
R2 within 0.297 0.337 0.402 0.297 0.337 0.402 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Variable 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
fe1lag fe2lag fe3lag fe1lag_rob fe2lag_rob fe3lag_rob 
Overall equalization fund, reve -.006519   -.006519   
 (.1617)   (.197)   
General allocation fund, revgaf  -.01982 -.02047  -.01982 -.02047 
  (.1655) (.1612)  (.1735) (.2545) 
Overall revenue sharing, shrev  -.09443   -.09443  
  (.2143)***   (.4356)**  
Tax-based revenue sharing, revx   .01608   .01608 
   (.1559)**   (.5825) 
Resource-based revenue sharing, revres   -.1152   -.1152 
   (.2601)***   (.6505)* 
Development level, manpc 2.386 2.542 2.596 2.386 2.542 2.596 
 (5.95e-08)*** (6.04e-08)*** (5.92e-08)*** (6.53e-07)+ (6.91e-07)+ (6.42e-07)* 
Development level (sq. term), manpc2 -1.648 -1.772 -1.981 -1.648 -1.772 -1.981 
 (1.07e-15)*** (1.10e-15)*** (1.09e-15)*** (1.07e-14)+ (1.09e-14)+ (1.18e-14)+ 
Equalization fund X Development    .09216   .09216   
level, reve X manpc (2.82e-08)*   (4.80e-08)   
General allocation fund X Development    .179 .2391  .179 .2391 
level, revgaf X manpc  (3.42e-08)*** (3.50e-08)***  (1.31e-07) (1.74e-07) 
Revenue sharing X Development   -.05603   -.05603  
level, shrev X manpc  (3.97e-08)**   (1.37e-07)  
Tax-based revenue sharing X Development    -.163   -.163 
level, revx X manpc   (4.96e-08)***   (4.37e-07) 
Resource-based revenue sharing X Development    .001821   .001821 
level, revres X manpc     (5.60e-08)     (1.37e-07) 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Variable 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
fe1lag fe2lag fe3lag fe1lag_rob fe2lag_rob fe3lag_rob 
Per capita development spending, devpc -.0943 -.08602 -.08624 -.0943 -.08602 -.08624 
 (3.58e-08)*** (3.50e-08)*** (3.42e-08)*** (1.73e-07)+ (1.57e-07)+ (1.41e-07)+ 
Public sector size, expgdp .1232 .1183 .1201 .1232 .1183 .1201 
 (.1873)*** (.1829)*** (.1785)*** (.8197)+ (.7722)+ (.6848)* 
Road quality, road -.04058 -.03493 -.03765 -.04058 -.03493 -.03765 
 (.1439)+ (.1403)+ (.1365)+ (.2413) (.2294) (.2265) 
Telephone access, phone -.05658 -.06825 -.06404 -.05658 -.06825 -.06404 
 (.2793)*** (.2731)*** (.2657)*** (.6674) (.705) (.6392)+ 
People ever/being in high school, sech .02014 .01477 .01724 .02014 .01477 .01724 
 (.38) (.3708) (.3631) (.3812) (.3334) (.3536) 
Share of manufacturing GDP, shman -.7636 -.7728 -.7886 -.7636 -.7728 -.7886 
 (.7932)*** (.7726)*** (.7545)*** (5.205)+ (4.987)* (4.57)* 
Sectoral concentration in the economy, ginisec .05002 .02489 .02751 .05002 .02489 .02751 
 (.7133) (.6955) (.682) (1.64) (1.668) (1.808) 
Urban population, shurb -.1098 -.1066 -.09998 -.1098 -.1066 -.09998 
 (.2877)* (.2801)* (.2734)* (.5095) (.4978) (.4404) 
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 
F stat 35.03 37.49 39.86 . . . 
Likelihood stat -80.96 -31.32 18.87 -80.96 -31.32 18.87 
R2 within 0.286 0.325 0.361 0.286 0.325 0.361 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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3.6.1 Fiscal decentralization and its interaction with development level 
The results in the baseline models (i.e., models 1-3) suggest that greater fiscal decentralization, 
measured by various proxies, significantly reduces the inequality between districts.
13
  One 
exception to the expected relationship is when the fiscal decentralization is measured by the tax-
based revenue sharing included in model 3, where its impact on the inequality is positive (i.e., an 
inequality-widening force), even though the impact is small and insignificant.  One plausible 
explanation for this exception is due to the tax-based revenue sharing scheme (see table 3.1).  
The sharing scheme for the two primary shareable taxes (i.e., personal income tax and company 
tax) disproportionately favors the central government.  All the company tax revenue generated in 
a district goes to the central government, while 80% the personal income tax revenue generated 
in a district flows to the central government.  The 2004 revised fiscal decentralization law 
allocates no share of the personal income tax to the districts outside the province where the tax-
producing district is located, while the 1999 original law does not even share the tax revenue 
with the other districts within the same province of the tax-producing district.  
The interpretation on the coefficient signs of the interactions terms between a 
decentralization indicator and the level of development depends on the coefficient sign of the 
decentralization indicator.  The positive coefficients of the interactions terms indicate that the 
reduction (widening) of inequality associated with decentralization decreases (increases) as the 
level of development increases.  The negative coefficients suggest that the reduction (widening) 
of inequality linked to decentralization increases (decreases) as the level of development 
increases.  
                                                             
13
 Given the construction of the inequality measure as the dependent variable, the negative sign of a 
parameter can also be interpreted as the effect of a predictor disproportionately favor the poorer districts, 
hence reducing inequality. 
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When measured by the overall equalization fund (as in the model 1) and the general 
allocation fund (as in model 2 and model 3), the negative association between inequality and 
decentralization is significantly moderated by the level of development.  In other words, the 
inequality-reducing effects of the overall equalization fund and the general allocation fund are 
reduced as the development level increases. The reason why the two indicators have the same 
positive interaction effects is because the overall equalization fund is the single most aggregated 
decentralization indicator used for the estimation and the general allocation fund had been a 
dominant part of the equalization fund, accounting for 73%-83% of the equalization fund during 
the study period.  The reason why the development level moderates the inequality-reducing 
effect of the general allocation fund is because the important component in the general allocation 
fund formula is the fiscal gap component, which is calculated as the difference between the 
expenditure needs and the fiscal capacity (World Bank 2007).  Since a higher level of 
development in a district implies that the district exercises greater fiscal capacity, it is reasonable 
to say that the general allocation fund formula favors the less developed districts, hence reducing 
inequality between districts, as indicated by the negative parameter sign.  Therefore, as the 
districts become more developed and richer (i.e., become more fiscally capable), the inequality-
reducing effect of the general allocation fund decreases.   
When decentralization is measured by the overall revenue sharing, the inequality-
reducing effect of the overall sharing revenue (as in model 2) is further augmented by the level 
of development.  Arguably, the richer or more developed districts will have a larger tax base and 
greater resource endowments.  The larger tax base and resource endowments the larger shared 
revenue a district will get, so it makes the district’s relative position to other districts even better.  
indicated by the inequality-reducing effect of the overall revenue sharing.  The estimated 
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interaction effect between the overall revenue sharing and the development level depicts a 
situation where the inequality-reducing effect of the overall revenue sharing increases as the 
district’s development level increases.  
The two components of the overall sharing revenue, i.e., the tax-based revenue sharing 
and the resources-based revenue sharing (as in model 3), appear to have the opposing individual 
and interaction effects.  As explained before, on its own, the tax-based revenue sharing has a 
positive (though insignificant) impact on inequality, but it has a significant negative interaction 
effect with the development level on inequality, indicating that its potential inequality-widening 
effect is reduced as the district’s level of development increases.  In contrast, the resources-based 
revenue sharing has a significant negative impact on inequality, but it has an insignificant 
positive interaction effect with the development level on inequality, suggesting that its 
inequality-reducing effect is independent of the level of development.  Of the components of the 
overall revenue sharing, the tax-based revenue sharing, when the districts become more 
developed, appears to exert a greater impact on system-wide equality.   
There are four plausible explanations for the observed opposing direction of the 
interaction effects with the development level on inequality between the tax-based revenue 
sharing and the resource-based revenue sharing.  First, resource endowments are geographically 
concentrated and immobile, while people and companies as the sources for the personal income 
and company tax are less concentrated and more mobile.  Secondly, the exploitation of resources 
is subject to some sort of depletion and whether its exploitation to generate development follows 
some sustainable practices.  Higher development level may entail more exploitation of resources, 
yet, sustainable practices in the exploitation may not be adopted.  If it is the case, the revenue 
generated from the resources could increase at a slower rate, therefore the inequality-reducing 
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effect of the resource-based revenue sharing decreases as the development level increases.  
Thirdly, a much larger portion of the revenue generated by most resources goes to the producing 
districts (see table 3.1).  Fourthly, a large proportion of the returns to the resource-based 
activities may actually accrue to external parties (e.g., foreign or national companies of the 
extractive industries), so the ‘net revenue’ to be shared under the revenue sharing scheme may be 
greatly discounted.   
In terms of magnitudes and signs, the estimates in the homoscedastic models 4-6 are the 
same as in the baseline models, only they have larger standard errors, with the result that some 
parameters become insignificant.  The single and most aggregated indicator of decentralization 
as measured by the overall equalization fund (as in model 4) is no longer significant.  However, 
the other more disaggregated indicators remain significant.  After controlling for 
heteroscedasticity, the general allocation fund, the overall revenue sharing, and the resource-
based revenue sharing still appear to have an inequality-reducing effect.  As was the case in 
model 3, the tax-based revenue sharing in model 6 remains insignificant.  No interaction effects 
are found to be significant in models 4-6.  Overall, the results in models 4-6 do not contradict the 
ones in model 1-3.  However, models 4-6 provide estimates that remain significant under the 
robust-clustered standard errors.  
 Models 7-9 were introduced to control for endogeneity issues and their results suggest no 
contradiction with the earlier findings.  In general, the observed individual and interaction effects 
in models 7-9 and in the previous models are the same; they differ only in the magnitude of the 
effects.  As in the baseline models, all interaction effects, except the interaction effect of the 
resource-based revenue sharing with the development level, are significant.  Compared with the 
results in the non-lag models (i.e., models 1-6), of the individual effects of the decentralization 
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proxies, the general allocation fund (as in model 8 and model 9) turns out to be insignificant, but 
the tax-based revenue sharing becomes significant.  Still, the role of the general allocation fund 
as an inequality-reducing force and the role of the tax-based as an inequality-widening force 
remain the same as in the previous models.  
 Such results may actually underline the different nature between the general allocation 
fund and the tax-based revenue sharing and shed light on the behavior of the district 
governments.  In addition to the fiscal gap, the other major component of the general allocation 
fund is the basic allocation.  From the beginning of the decentralization in 2001 until 2005, the 
basic allocation consisted of a lump sum and a partial coverage for the civil service wage bill, but 
full coverage for the civil service wage bill since 2006 (World Bank 2007).  In other words, 
some portion of the general allocation fund received by a district government is actually less tied 
to the productive and creative activities that possibly bring some economic gains for the district 
that may significantly improve the district’s economic well-being compared with other districts, 
hence leading to the significant reduction in inequality.  On the other hand, the tax-revenue 
sharing is reasonably more related to the district’s economic activities and the performance of the 
district government in generating the tax revenue.  The lag models that include the general 
allocation fund (models 8, 9, 11 and 12) show that the inequality-reducing role of the general 
equalization fund becomes insignificant.   
 Models 10-12 are the corresponding models for models 7-9, after controlling for 
heteroscedasticity.  In terms of the signs and coefficients, the results are still consistent, but as 
expected, due to the larger robust-clustered standard errors in models 10-12, some parameters 
become insignificant.  The overall revenue sharing and the resource-based revenue sharing still 
stand out as the significant inequality-reducing forces.  Hence, the basic story remains the same, 
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that is a greater fiscal decentralization, as measured by the overall revenue sharing and the 
resource-based revenue, leads to a significant reduction in inequality between districts.  
 
3.6.2 Marginal effect 
In the section 3.6.1, we present and discuss some evidence of the interaction effects between the 
various decentralization proxies and the level of development.  In this current section, we 
quantify and plot how the marginal effect of decentralization changes the indicators across the 
observed range of per capita manufacturing GDP.  The calculation of the marginal effect is based 
on the estimates of models 7-9 that control for endogeneity and have nearly all significant 
interaction effects.  The marginal effect of decentralization is plotted in figures 3.5(a)-(e) with 
the values of the development level reported in table 3.8.  The solid sloping line in figures 3.5(a)-
(e) indicates how the marginal effect of a decentralization indicator on inequality changes with 
the development level, while the dotted lines depict the 95% confidence interval.  Following 
Brambor et al. (2006), the marginal effect is statistically significant wherever the upper and the 
lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (below) the zero line.     
 Figures 3.5(a)-(e) support the estimates, confirming that while greater fiscal 
decentralization plays a role in the reduction in inequality across districts, the inequality-
decentralization relationship is mediated by the development level of the districts.  As the level 
of development increases, the inequality-reducing effect of the overall equalization fund and the 
general allocation fund decreases, implying that the effect is lower in the better-off districts.  In 
contrast, the inequality-reducing effect of the overall sharing revenue increases as the level of 
development rises, suggesting that effect is higher in the more developed districts.  The marginal 
effect of the overall equalization fund and the general equalization fund are insignificant for the 
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very least developed districts (figures 3.5(a), (b), and (d)), but the effect of the overall sharing 
revenue and the tax-based revenue sharing (figures 3.5(c) and (e)) are significant for all levels of 
development.   
Some reasons for the observed pattern are proposed as follows.  Firstly, the marginal 
effect of the overall equalization fund and the general allocation fund are similar because the 
general allocation fund had been dominant part of the total equalization fund.  Secondly, taking 
into account the district’s development level, the marginal effect of the general allocation fund 
appears to be statistically insignificant for the very least developed districts because the very 
least developed districts are much likely to have extremely low fiscal capacity (very small 
revenue base).  Moreover, they might not have much options, ability, or incentive to raise their 
fiscal capacity.  After all, the fiscal gap as the difference between their expenditure needs and 
their fiscal capacity will be accounted in the general allocation fund they are going to receive.  
Such lack of options, ability, or incentive may not significantly promote the very least developed 
districts’ relative economic performance compared with other more developed districts, therefore 
making the marginal effect of general allocation fund insignificant for the least developed 
districts.  Thirdly, the marginal effect of the sharing revenue is significant regardless of the 
development level because the revenue sharing scheme ensures that even non-producing districts 
of within the same or outside province as the producing district will get some portion of some 
revenue sources.    
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Figure 3.5(a) Marginal effect, the overall equalization fund (as in model 7)  
 
 
Figure 3.5(b) Marginal effect, the general equalization fund (as in model 8)  
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Figure 3.5(c) Marginal effect, the overall sharing revenue (as in model 8)  
 
 
Figure 3.5(d) Marginal effect, the general allocation fund (as in model 9)  
 
113 
 
 
Figure 3.5(e) Marginal effect, the tax-based revenue sharing (as in model 9)  
 
 
Table 3.8 Decentralization marginal effects 
 
Marginal effects 
Development level, fe1lag fe2lag fe3lag 
manpc (Rp. million) reve revgaf shrev revgaf revx 
25 1.444437* 4.004028*** -4.053937*** 5.417542*** -11.79882*** 
28 1.634838* 4.511095*** -4.396487*** 6.0951*** -13.26476*** 
31 1.825239* 5.018161*** -4.739036*** 6.772657*** -14.7307*** 
34 2.01564* 5.525228*** -5.081585*** 7.450214*** -16.19664*** 
37 2.206041* 6.032295*** -5.424134*** 8.127772*** -17.66257*** 
40 2.396443* 6.539362*** -5.766684*** 8.805329*** -19.12851*** 
43 2.586844* 7.046428*** -6.109233*** 9.482887*** -20.59445*** 
46 2.777245* 7.553495*** -6.451782*** 10.16044*** -22.06039*** 
49 2.967646* 8.060562*** -6.794331*** 10.838*** -23.52632*** 
52 3.158047* 8.567629*** -7.136881*** 11.51556*** -24.99226*** 
55 3.348448* 9.074695*** -7.47943*** 12.19312*** -26.4582*** 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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3.6.3 Control variables 
Many factors can act as either concentration or dispersion forces to eventually determine spatial 
inequality (Kim 2008).  The control variables included in all models are expected to influence 
the observed inequality.  Existing levels of development measured by per capita manufacturing 
GDP consistently affects inequality (significant in the lagged models, i.e., models 7-12, and in 
most of the non-lagged models, i.e., models 1-6).  Across the models, the coefficients of the 
development level are similar and the parameter signs remain the same.  Indeed, the development 
level effect is much greater than any other decentralization measures.  Development level 
estimates suggest that the Kuznets/Williamson inverted U-shape for the inequality-level of 
development relationship also holds for this current research.  
Table 3.9 lists cut-off estimates along with their percentile and bias corrected 
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the optimal level of development.  The bootstrap repeats 
through 1000 iterations.  A cut-off estimate is calculated as (-1)*( ̂      ̂      ⁄  .  For 
example, using the results in model 1 (i.e., fe1), the observed cut-off estimate of 33,700,000 
implies that inequality increases with the level of development until its peak at Rp.33,700,000 
(roughly $ 3,066.70 as of October 27, 2013) before inequality is expected to decline.  For each 
model, the percentile and bias-corrected methods provide similar results, indicating that the 
calculated cut-off is unbiased.  Across the models, the observed values and their confidence 
intervals are also similar.  Overall, the optimum development level estimate is more than 25 
times larger than the average level of development measured as per-capita non-oil and gas 
manufacturing GDP (i.e., Rp.1,183, 539; see table 3.6 for descriptive statistics).  Most 
Indonesian districts are far from the optimum level of development after which inequality is 
expected to decline.   
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Table 3.9 Cut-off estimates of development level (Indonesian Rp.) 
Model Observed 95% Confidence Interval 
(1) fe1 33,700,000 24,000,000 51,400,000 (P) 
  
24,600,000 54,000,000 (BC) 
(2) fe2 34,800,000 23,700,000 58,700,000 (P) 
  
23,700,000 58,400,000 (BC) 
(3) fe3 32,100,000 18,600,000 60,400,000 (P) 
  
19,500,000 65,400,000 (BC) 
(4) fe1_ron 33,700,000 24,000,000 51,400,000 (P) 
  
24,600,000 54,000,000 (BC) 
(5) fe2_rob 34,800,000 23,700,000 58,700,000 (P) 
  
23,700,000 58,400,000 (BC) 
(6) fe3_rob 32,100,000 18,600,000 60,400,000 (P) 
  
19,500,000 65,400,000 (BC) 
(7) fe1lag 33,100,000 20,700,000 47,400,000 (P) 
  
22,900,000 49,200,000 (BC) 
(8) fe2lag 32,800,000 18,400,000 47,200,000 (P) 
  
22,700,000 51,000,000 (BC) 
(9) fe3lag 30,000,000 17,700,000 47,300,000 (P) 
  
18,400,000 50,100,000 (BC) 
(10) fe1lag_rob 33,100,000 20,700,000 47,400,000 (P) 
  
22,900,000 49,200,000 (BC) 
(11) fe2lag_rob 32,800,000 18,400,000 47,200,000 (P) 
  
22,700,000 51,000,000 (BC) 
(12) fe3lag_rob 30,000,000 17,700,000 47,300,000 (P) 
  
18,400,000 50,100,000 (BC) 
Note: P=percentile; B=bias corrected 
 
In all models, a greater per capita development spending leads to a significant reduction 
in inequality, while a larger public sector size significantly widens inequality.  There is 
significant evidence that infrastructure acts as an inequality-reducing force across the models.  
As such, it seems that telephone access is more important than road quality.  Two reasons are 
proposed: first, by construction, the proxy for road quality only captures the road quality within 
districts and not that between districts (widely known as the jalan provinsi, “the provincial 
road”).  The provincial roads that connect districts are possibly of poor quality, as in off-Jawa 
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provinces, or heavily congested, as in the Jawa’s Northern Route (Jalur Pantura), hindering 
factor mobility or creating diseconomies of scale, thus limiting its capacity as equalizer.  Second, 
telephone access allows people to obtain access to the internet, from which people receive and 
exchange information.
14
  As a result of better information, people may become more demanding 
of better public services, along with greater transparency, accountability, and governance.  The 
net result of these forces may play an important role as equalizer.  
The estimates find no significant effect on the inequality of high school graduates or the 
district’s economic concentration.  There is some limited evidence of the inequality-reducing 
effect of the population concentration in a district’s urban area.  This may indicate the 
importance of scale economies on urban concentration, where a highly concentrated urban 
population facilitates better information exchange and better public service delivery in a district, 
leading to a reduction in equality between districts.  In all models, there is significance evidence 
that the manufacturing sector in the economy serves as an inequality-reducing force.  
 
3.7 Conclusion, policy implications, and research extension 
3.7.1 Conclusion  
Between 2001 and 2007, fiscal decentralization in Indonesia generated a decrease in inequality 
across Indonesian districts, measured by district-level per capita GDP with and without oil and 
gas.  The observed reduction in inequality was attributable to a reduction in within-province 
inequality and a reduction in relative provincial means.  
Applying the fixed-effects approach to a panel dataset at the district level, this paper 
analyzes the effect of the current fiscal decentralization arrangement on between-districts 
                                                             
14
 Even though smart mobile phones have become increasingly popular in Indonesia in the last five years, 
Indonesian people still largely rely on landlines for the internet access, especially within the study period.  
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inequality, the way in which the inequality-decentralization relationship is mediated by the 
district’s level of development, the contribution of different components of the equalization fund 
on inequality, and how other factors may have affected the observed inequality.  
The various estimation strategies employed in this research present a consistent pattern of 
results, suggesting that, in general, greater fiscal decentralization significantly reduces the 
inequality between districts.  Yet, a finer disaggregation of the decentralization measure reveals 
that there is limited evidence of an inequality-widening effect of tax-based revenue sharing, even 
though the inequality-widening effect decreases as the level of development rises.  On the other 
hand, the inequality-reducing effects of other fiscal decentralization instruments are also 
moderated by the level of development.  The results show that the level of development on its 
own plays a critical role in determining the observed inequality while acting as a modifying 
factor that affects the effect of a fiscal decentralization indicator on the observed inequality.  
The research also reveals significant evidence of the equalizing role of development 
spending, the manufacturing sector, infrastructure, urban concentration, and the inequality-
promoting role of public sector size.  Apart from its extensiveness and novelties, this research 
bears important policy implications.  The findings of this research have the potential to help 
guide the efforts addressing Indonesia’s interregional inequality, either through improving the 
decentralization framework or addressing complementary public policy options related to 
spending, the role and size of the public sector, infrastructure, economic structure, and urban 
population at the district level.  
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3.7.2 Policy implications 
As demonstrated in this paper, decentralization is a necessary and welfare-enhancing policy, 
effective in addressing regional disparities.  However, as this paper also shows, development 
level factors, among others, also play a role in the observed inequality dynamics.  Therefore, the 
continuing implementation of decentralization is justified and necessary, yet it should be linked 
to a broader development strategy aimed at a higher level of development as a primary and 
ultimate objective.  To catch up with richer districts, district governments need to formulate and 
implement good development strategies that may include preserving and attracting economic 
activities in a sector deemed to an engine for the economy, such as the manufacturing sector.
15
   
The inward investment can be lured by increasing the level or improving the quality of 
infrastructure.  To generate and to exploit economies of scale, or because a certain kind of 
infrastructure is simply too expensive, it is sometimes better for a district to cooperate with other 
districts.  In this regard, for other functions or issues affecting many districts, the role of 
provincial governments can be called for or reinforced.  Cooperation between districts can take 
various forms.  The simplest option might be a forum in which to share best practices in public 
service deliveries.           
The current level of district government revenues is much higher than that before 
decentralization.  So, the issue is an efficient use of government resources rather than the 
mobilization of additional resources, especially through measures that generate additional 
business costs.  Thus, options to ensure spending efficiency may include devising performance 
measurements that allow for comparisons across districts or incorporating incentives for prudent 
                                                             
15 Recall that table 3.7 presents estimates in terms of standardized beta to allow for a comparison of the 
relative importance of the impact of the predictors that are originally measured in different scales.  Both 
development level and the share of manufacturing sector in the economy exert the highest impacts, even 
larger than that of various decentralization measures.  
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spending into the intergovernmental transfer mechanism.  Excessive additional resources and 
discretionary spending power can lead to unwise and wasteful spending, diverting public 
resources from public service delivery and pro-poor policies to excessively high administration 
expenditures, including civil salary increases and various benefits for local elites.   
A lack of scrutiny and standards will only perpetuate wasteful spending.  Effective 
scrutiny and standard implementation require coordination between district governments, the 
central government, and various government agencies.  Other big challenges include 
streamlining the budget approval process and incorporating off-budget spending to ensure 
efficient spending and that the budget reflects the planning.  Again, central and provincial 
governments are needed for technical assistance and policy coordination.   
Another coordination issue is the potential conflict between the decentralization laws and 
the sectoral laws; hence, a power struggle results between the district governments and the line 
ministries over certain policy implementation.  One example is the basic and secondary 
education sector.  On one hand, decentralization has already placed the basic and secondary 
education sector in the hands of the district governments; however, for some reason, the ministry 
of national education has been deeply involved in creating programs or projects that duplicate the 
obligations of district governments.  Such redundancy, and thus budget inefficiency, could be 
reduced if there is good coordination between the district government and the ministry of 
national education, in order to limit the latter’s role in monitoring and ensuring national 
standards.   
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3.7.3 Research extension 
This present research explores how the intergovernmental transfer instruments introduced in the 
2001 decentralization may affect income disparities across districts.  The transfer instruments of 
the equalization fund are essentially vertical in nature, as they are primarily administered by the 
central government and subsequently distributed and shared with the districts and provinces.  
One notable exception is the corporate income taxes that are completely collected for the central 
government.  
This study has not yet formally addressed the horizontal relationships or 
interjurisdictional competition, and hence spatial spillovers, between districts, which can be 
expected under decentralization.  The Indonesian 2001 decentralization framework represents, 
rather, a greater autonomy in spending than in tax or other revenue sources.  Fewer constraints 
on the expenditure side may generate stronger interjurisdictional competition in spending.  Such 
competition could be a good thing if it encourages yardstick competition, further creating spatial 
spillovers on the quality of service.  During the study period, it was public knowledge that many 
district governments visited Jembrana in Bali province, a small district that cannot be considered 
a rich district, but with widely recognized service deliveries and a high quality of public health 
and education.  However, the imitation effect could also be “the bad kind.”  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that spending on increased salaries and benefits, cars, and buildings drives imitation 
between districts.  Future research will explore such spatial spillovers and consider how the 
presence of interjurisdictional competition may affect the districts’ economic performance and 
accountability mechanisms in decentralized Indonesia.  
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Chapter 4 
Concluding Remarks:  
Policy Implications and Further Research 
 
4.1 East Java convergence 
The striking findings include the increasing trend of inequality, the persistence of inequality or 
distinct clusters of districts of low, medium, and high income, and a slow and conditional 
catching up process.  Given the study’s objective to focus on measurement issues and 
convergence characteristics, a specific policy prescription is not offered.  However, as a note for 
further research, this section will outline a generic policy response with regard to the observed 
pattern and dynamics of spatial inequality in East Java.  
The findings offer an invitation for scholars and policy makers to revisit the old, but not 
obsolete, debate between a strategy of place-based prosperity and of people-centered prosperity, 
and the specific potential applications suitable to East Java.  On the strategy of place-based 
prosperity, the challenges include promoting the development of economic and social 
infrastructure in the lagging districts, and helping them to benefit from economic integration.  
Regarding the people-centered prosperity, the migrations of individuals or households to the 
other places of high and rising prosperity should be facilitated, or at least not impeded.  The 
challenge is to balance between efforts that promote a more spatially equitable allocation of 
resources (e.g., infrastructure, services) and the ones that promote freer human migration.  
Further research in this area should also seek to identify the economic potential of each 
underdeveloped district.  Such an identification may reveal potential economic engines for 
growth that could possibly diminish the spatial income gap in the long run.  Policy makers and 
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economic developers should remain optimistic about the possibility of devising an innovative 
development policy even in the lagging places that inevitably face numerous constraints.  Fritsch 
(2003) argues that an innovation-oriented policy does not depend on the extent of centrality, as 
he observes that innovative activities are also evident in less agglomerated areas.  
 
4.2 Indonesian decentralization 
Decentralization has narrowed inequality between Indonesian districts.  This result suggests that 
Indonesia should continue to implement decentralization.  Moreover, decentralization should be 
seen as part of a broader development strategy in which the ultimate objective is a higher level of 
development.  Preserving and attracting economic activities should be the primary features of 
district governments’ economic development plan.  These efforts entail many other measures, 
such as: 1) maintaining and improving the level and quality of infrastructure, and 2) reaching out 
for cooperation with other districts to share best practices, to share the costs of a certain 
development project, or to generate and exploit economies of scale.  
Decentralization has provided higher levels of revenue and unprecedented opportunities 
for district governments.  The challenge has now shifted to whether district governments are able 
to focus on how to spend their resources efficiently, instead of mobilizing resources in a way that 
can increase the costs of doing business. Discretionary spending power over vast additional 
financial resources can create unwise and wasteful spending, diverting public resources needed 
to improve public service deliveries and competitiveness to unreasonably high administration 
spending.  Options to prevent such spending inefficiencies may include incorporating incentives 
for prudent spending into the intergovernmental transfer mechanism and devising performance 
measurements that allow for comparisons across districts.   
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Nonetheless, district level decentralization should not abandon the role of provincial and 
central government.  After all, the effective incentives (including scrutiny) and implementation 
of the performance standards entail a good coordination between district governments, the 
central government, and various government agencies.  Streamlining the budget approval 
process, incorporating off-budget spending to ensure efficiency in spending, and crafting a 
budget closely connected with development planning all require the role of central and provincial 
government for technical assistance and policy coordination.   
During the implementation of certain policies, such as those in the basic and secondary 
education sector, decentralization may raise a potential conflict between the decentralization 
laws and the sectoral laws.  This could result in a power struggle between the district 
governments and the line ministries.  Although decentralization has already placed the basic and 
secondary education sector in the hands of district governments, the ministry of national 
education has remained highly involved in this policy area, carrying out programs or projects 
that actually duplicate the district governments’ obligations.  Such a redundancy not only implies 
budget inefficiency, but could be minimized if the district government and the ministry of 
national education were to develop effective coordination, such that the latter could limit its role 
to monitoring and ensuring national standards.   
This thesis explores how the 2001 intergovernmental transfer may influence income 
disparities across districts.  The transfer instruments of the equalization fund are essentially 
vertical in nature, as the central government administers and subsequently distributes them to the 
districts and provinces.  As such, this research has not yet formally handled the horizontal 
relationships or interjurisdictional competition, and hence does not address some of the spatial 
spillovers between districts that can be expected under decentralization.   
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Many regard the Indonesian 2001 decentralization to be on the spending side, as its 
framework gives a greater autonomy in spending rather than in tax or other revenue sources.  
Indeed, less constrained expenditure may lead to stronger interjurisdictional competition in 
spending.  Good competition drives yardstick comparisons that create knowledge spillovers 
across districts on the quality of service.  Many district governments have visited Jembrana, a 
small and poor district in Bali province, to learn from its highly praised service deliveries and 
high quality public health and education.  However, imitation is not always good.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that expenditures by neighboring districts on increased salaries and benefits, 
cars, and buildings can encourage imitation by other districts.  Both types of spatial spillovers 
will be explored in future studies.  My next research project intends to understand how the 
presence of spatial competition/imitation may affect districts’ economic performance and 
accountability.  
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Appendix A 
Supplementary Material to Chapter 2 
 
Table A.1 Inequality levels by various inequality measures 
Year p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50 p75/p25 Gini GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) A(0.5) A(1) A(2) 
1980 2.65 2.03 0.77 1.51 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.44 0.10 0.16 0.23 
1981 2.64 2.09 0.79 1.58 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.40 0.09 0.15 0.21 
1982 2.72 1.95 0.72 1.62 0.30 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.40 0.09 0.15 0.22 
1983 2.67 1.89 0.71 1.51 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.32 0.08 0.13 0.19 
1984 2.64 1.84 0.70 1.56 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.33 0.08 0.13 0.19 
1985 2.58 1.85 0.72 1.62 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.32 0.08 0.13 0.19 
1986 2.66 1.87 0.70 1.63 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.33 0.08 0.13 0.20 
1987 2.67 1.91 0.72 1.75 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.38 0.09 0.14 0.21 
1988 2.90 2.08 0.72 1.75 0.30 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.39 0.09 0.15 0.22 
1989 2.93 2.08 0.71 1.86 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.41 0.09 0.15 0.23 
1990 3.15 2.21 0.70 1.91 0.32 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.16 0.24 
1991 3.24 2.25 0.69 1.92 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.16 0.24 
1992 3.25 2.25 0.69 1.92 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.16 0.24 
1993 4.50 3.29 0.73 2.20 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.86 0.17 0.27 0.38 
1994 4.60 3.38 0.73 2.29 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.46 0.94 0.18 0.29 0.39 
1995 4.71 3.45 0.73 2.38 0.46 0.35 0.35 0.49 1.02 0.19 0.30 0.41 
1996 4.92 3.61 0.73 2.46 0.47 0.36 0.36 0.50 1.04 0.19 0.30 0.42 
1997 5.03 3.64 0.72 2.48 0.47 0.37 0.38 0.52 1.12 0.20 0.31 0.43 
1998 4.30 3.22 0.75 2.46 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.57 1.35 0.21 0.33 0.43 
1999 4.17 3.13 0.75 2.45 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.57 1.34 0.21 0.32 0.43 
2000 4.04 3.06 0.76 2.40 0.47 0.37 0.38 0.56 1.30 0.21 0.32 0.42 
2001 4.88 3.09 0.63 1.52 0.49 0.39 0.42 0.64 1.60 0.23 0.34 0.44 
2002 4.92 3.04 0.62 1.54 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.61 1.46 0.22 0.33 0.43 
2003 4.98 3.02 0.61 1.51 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.61 1.47 0.22 0.33 0.43 
2004 5.02 3.02 0.60 1.50 0.49 0.38 0.41 0.62 1.51 0.22 0.34 0.43 
2005 5.06 3.00 0.59 1.53 0.49 0.39 0.42 0.63 1.54 0.23 0.34 0.44 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table A.2 Transition probability matrix, Categorization 2 
 per capita GDP (in thousand Rp.), 2005 
 Classes < 750 750 - 1000 1001 - 1300 1301 - 1600 > 1600 
 < 750 91.3% 6.2% 1.1% 0.2% 1.3% 
 750 - 1000 3.6% 75.7% 6.4% 0.0% 14.3% 
1980 1001 - 1300 0.0% 10.2% 61.2% 12.2% 16.3% 
 1301 - 1600 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
 > 1600 12.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 87.0% 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Table A.3 Dynamic characteristics, Categorization 2 
Stationary Distribution 
per capita GDP, Classes Share of population 
< Rp. 750,000 49% 
Rp. 751,000 - Rp. 1,000,000 14% 
Rp. 1,001,000 - Rp. 1,300,000 5% 
Rp. 1,301,000 - Rp. 1,600,000 2% 
> Rp. 1,600,000 30% 
Convergence Statistics 
Half-life 3.3 periods 
S 0.73 
C_the 3rd 0.25 
C_the 4th 0.26 
Mean First Passage Time 
Class Mobility MFPT (years) 
From class 1 to class 4 137.8 
From class 2 to class 4 132.8 
From class 3 to class 4 96.7 
From class 5 to class 4 140.7 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table A.4 Transition probability matrix, Categorization 3 
 per capita GDP (in thousand Rp.), 2005 
 Classes < 1000 1001 - 1300 1301 - 1600 1601 - 1900 > 1900 
 < 1000 93.3% 2.3% 0.2% 0.5% 3.8% 
 1001 - 1300 10.2% 61.2% 12.2% 0.0% 16.3% 
1980 1301 - 1600 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 6.3% 18.8% 
 1601 - 1900 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 
 > 1900 12.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 86.5% 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Table A.5 Dynamic characteristics, Categorization 3 
Stationary Distribution 
per capita GDP, Classes Share of population 
< Rp. 1,000,000 62% 
Rp. 1,001,000 - Rp. 1,300,000 5% 
Rp. 1,301,000 - Rp. 1,600,000 2% 
Rp. 1,601,000 - Rp. 1,900,000 1% 
> Rp. 1,900,000 30% 
Convergence Statistics 
Half-life 2.7 periods 
S 0.70 
C_the 3rd 0.24 
C_the 4th 0.27 
Mean First Passage Time 
Class Mobility MFPT (years) 
From class 1 to class 4 191.6 
From class 2 to class 4 187.7 
From class 3 to class 4 168.5 
From class 5 to class 4 193.8 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Appendix B 
Supplementary Material to Chapter 3 
 
Table B.1 Number of districts by province 
Region Province Kabupaten Kota Districts 
Sumatera  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 11 2 13 
(9 provinces) Sumatera Utara 13 6 19 
 
Sumatera Barat 9 6 15 
 
Riau 12 3 15 
 
Jambi 9 1 10 
 
Sumatera Selatan 6 1 7 
 
Bengkulu 3 1 4 
 
Lampung 8 2 10 
 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 2 1 3 
Jawa-Bali DKI Jakarta 1 5 6 
(7 provinces) Jawa Barat 16 6 22 
 
Banten 4 2 6 
 
Jawa Tengah 29 6 35 
 
DI Yogyakarta 4 1 5 
 
Jawa Timur 29 8 37 
 
Bali 8 1 9 
Kalimantan Kalimantan Barat 8 1 9 
(4 provinces) Kalimantan Tengah 5 1 6 
 
Kalimantan Selatan 9 2 11 
 
Kalimantan Timur 8 4 12 
Sulawesi Sulawesi Utara 3 2 5 
(5 provinces) Sulawesi Tengah 7 1 8 
 
Sulawesi Selatan 22 2 24 
 
Sulawesi Tenggara 4 1 5 
 
Gorontalo 2 1 3 
Eastern Indonesia Nusa Tenggara Barat 6 1 7 
(5 provinces) Nusa Tenggara Timur 13 1 14 
 
Maluku 4 1 5 
 
Maluku Utara 2 1 3 
 
Papua 12 2 14 
Indonesia 269 73 342 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Table B.2 Number of districts by region 
Region  Kabupaten Kota  Districts 
Sumatera 73 23 96 
Jawa-Bali 91 29 120 
Kalimantan 30 8 38 
Sulawesi 38 7 45 
Eastern Indonesia 37 6 43 
Indonesia 269 73 342 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
Table B.3 Coefficient of inequality  
Index 
Per capita Per capita 
GDP GDP no oil 
2001 2007 2001 2007 
GE(-1) 0.503 0.401 0.313 0.287 
GE(0) 0.486 0.385 0.319 0.285 
GE(1) 0.768 0.548 0.481 0.395 
GE(2) 2.856 1.419 1.400 0.876 
Gini 0.533 0.478 0.434 0.411 
A(0.5) 0.262 0.205 0.175 0.153 
A(1) 0.385 0.320 0.273 0.248 
A(2) 0.502 0.445 0.385 0.365 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
